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I NTRODUCTI ON 
The ch ange in the production f QDCtion of department 
stores has posed many financi al problems. Retail ers are faced 
wi th t h e general strugg l e f or survival in an i ndustry , wh ich 
has t h e h i ghest failure record. More specifically, they 
must con tend with t h e problems of declining sales volume i n 
dovmt m'IT1 metropolitan di s tricts. In the hope of s timulat ing 
business department stores open new outlets in subur ban communi-
ties. 
The retail i ndustry is confronted with the difficul t ies 
of increased competition. Discoun t houses and supermarkets 
cut into t he dep artment s tores' share of the conswner dollar. 
Stores struggle to maintain t heir pr of it margins in the face 
of severe price competition and mounting expen ses. 
Department stores must f i nd ways to finance their 
short term needs. More goods a re purchased on credit. 
Stores find credit to be a valuable but co stl y pr omotiona l 
tool. Addi tional funds are t ied up i n accounts r eceivable 
and more workli~g capi tal i s required. A l arge amount of 
fund s to support t he se transaction s is coming f rom outside 
s our ce s such as ba nks, sales fin ance comp ani e s an d factors. 
As profit ma r gins decline , other i n come becomes more 
import~~t to profitability. Revenues from carrying charges 
and l eased department operations a r e the mo s t significan t 
of these items. Depart ment stores must decide whether 
8 
a charge f or credit is justified . They mu s t solve the i s sue 
o f whether it pay s to lease out departments. 
The expan sion of department stores int o suburbru~ area 
bring s about several long-term f i nancial problems. Department 
stores mus t find a way to finance these n ew branch es. In 
most cases t his will require long-ter m f und s from outside 
s ources. A f irm mus t dec i de whe t her it will seek fund s 
throug h the debt or equity r oute. A popular altern2.tive has 
been t he sale and l easeback arrangemen t with an i nsurance 
company. We shall discuss t he various ways in which a deparment 
store may f inance its expansion needs . 
The purpo se of this s tudy is to present these financ :ial 
i s sue s and to anal yze the various me thods available to solve 
t hese problems . Th ere is n o panacea . The solution will be 
different f or each i ndividual deparmen t stor e. A compreherl.-
sive view of these i ssues will shed light on the di fficul ties 
shared by t h e industry . 
Hi s torical data have been used to show the ways in 
whi ch departmen t stores h andl ed these problems in t h e past . 
Statistical comparisons of opera ting s t atement s highlight 
t h e distinct characteristics of t he retailing-general merchand-
ising i ndu s try . We have dravm upon data compiled by reporting 
agencies wi thin t he field as welll as materi al compiled specifically 
f or t c1is stt..1dy . 
In Chapter I, we shall discuss the changes in the 
production function of dep artment stores . We sh all see the 
eff ect of this change on operating re sul t s in Chap t er II . 
Chapte r III will be an analysis of department stores 
short-term problems of financing credit, follov,red by an 
analysis of l eased department op eration in Chapter IV. 
Fi n ally , i n Chap ter V, we will l ook at t he depar t ment 
stor es lo~~g -te rm financi ... g n eeds. 
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Chapter I 
RECEI T PROBLEMS I N THE PRODUCTION :b'UNCTION OF 
TH£ DEPARTMENT STORE INDUSTRY 
A. Retail Failures 
Department stores must cont end with the general 
problems fa cing t h e r etail i ndus try. Retail f irms h ave t h e 
• - i\ 
wor st survival record of all business establ1snmen ts . It 
was fom!d that 3/ 5ths survive t heir first f ull year of 
operation and about l/6th reach the age of ten years. The 
picture is bleak, compared to the wholesale trade, which has 
t he best survival record. In this same study, 3/4th s of these 
new whole sale f irms survived one year and 30% survived more 
t han ten years. 
Table I 
Retail and Industrial and Commercial Failures 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Total 
Failures 
8,862 
11,086 
10,969 
12,686 
13,739 
Failures 
4,381 
5,491 
5,339 
6,341 
6,895 
% Retail of 
Total 
49.4 
49.5 
48.7 
50.0 
50.2 
Total Retail 
Liab. (thous ) 
$117,299 
145,473 
121,619 
1 56 ,051 
186, 847 
Source: U.S. Department of Conooerce, Survey of Current 
Business, 1954, 1956, 1957, Vols. 34-37. 
Ave. $ Liab, 
Per Failure 
$26 , 774 
26 , 493 
22 , 779 
24, 610 
27 ,099 
Retail failures account for about 50% of all t he 
business failures in the United States. The average dollar 
amount of liability p er f ailure run s about $25 ,000. This 
is a good indication of the cause of the large number of 
-* 44, p. 15. 
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failu r e s. A ret ai l es tablishment can be started on a r el ati ve-
ly small amount of capital, wher eas o ther enter pri ses r equi r e 
l a r ger i nitial cap ital outlays. Th is allows easy f r eedom of 
en t r y i n t '1e f i eld. In a ddition the retailing i ndu str y i s char-
a cterized by severe competition. St rictest co s t control 
must ope r·ate in orde r to r e ceive a r ea sonable r ·2turn on the 
i nvested capital. Th e department store is conf ronted wi t h 
t h e dangers i nh er en t i n the industry. The managers of the 
department store mu s t make fin~~cial plans wi th gr ea t ca r e . 
B. Sales Declin e 
In almo s t all t h e l a r ge citi es of the coun t ry 
surrounded by l a rge metropolitan a r eas, department store sal e s 
decreased . What is t he r eason f or this decline? 
Table II 
Percen t Loss of To tal Departmen t Store Busine ss In Central 
Retail Di s tricts-Ma j or Citie s 
( con s ta:..'l t dollar sal e s 1948-1954 on ba sis of perc entage loss) 
New York 16% 
Chicago 14% 
Philadelph ia 15% 
Bos t on 4% 
Los Angeles 26% 
Washington , D.C. 17% 
Detr oit 20% 
Clevel and 3% 
Pitt sburgh 32% 
Newa r k 14% 
Sour ce: Robert H. Armstrong , "Ch an gi ng Do¥mtovm Patterns'', 
Urban Land, June 1957, p. 2 
Table I I I 
Bo s ton Department Store Sale s (Central Retail District) 
1947-1949 average -100 
Year 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
19 54 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Index (Unadju sted) 
100 
100 
102 
104 
102 
102 
103 
103 
103 
97# 
Index (l957-it9$) 
97 . 3 
98 . 2 
99.2 
93 . 7 
89 .9 
89 . 2 
89.7 
90 .0 
88.6 
81 .1 
#Average f or first nine months compared with average f or 
fir st nine months l 947-/t9. Therefore , chang e is not due 
to seasonal factors. 
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Source : Arthur D. Li ttle, Inc . "Preliminar y Research fo r the 
Redevelopment of Bo s t on's Retail Di strict" Report to 
Boston City Planning Board , Cambridge , Mass., 1957 , 
p . 7 Table II. 
Changes in living patterns, realignment of i ncome 
among people , and transportation problems are all contributing 
factor s . In r ecen t years n ew pattern s o f living have emerged. 
The grov~ ing mo·:1eyed mi ddle cla s ses con tinue to migrat e t o the 
suburbs. The se are the income groups which have the greatest 
per capita consumption potential. Department stor es h ave 
always relied on t hese mi ddle ru1d upper income bracket families 
f or t he l a r ge s t share of their patronage . The lm·:er income 
segment has insufficient funds l eft after . sp ending on the 
necessities of lif e to be importan t customers in department 
stores, other than in the basement depar tments. Since m-e r-
chandise can only be sold i n areas a ccessible (or r elatively so) 
13 
to centers of population, the department stores follow 
t h e population to suburban areas. It is easier to bring t he 
department stores out to the suburbs than to bring t h e 
people into downtown shopping areas. 
~e use of the automobile has gro~~ but do~ntovTil 
parking facilities have not grown at a comparable r ate . People 
are tired of the downtown confusion and traffic j a~s . They 
-)~ 
want to shop easily and comf ortably. As a result, people 
do less downtown shopp ing and the depa rtment stores suffer. 
Wnat are department stores doing about this? They 
are expanding t heir out l e ts into suburban communities. 
Branch stores and shopping cen ters are mushrooming over t h e 
coU11tryside. From 1940 on both t he population and purchasing 
povrer of that population have shown a steady, rapi d growth. 
11 In terms of uniform dollars, the volume of r etail purch ases 
in the United States has increased. 11 More merchandise h as 
been sold. This increase in volume has created a demand for 
more retail outlets and expansion of t h e existing ones . 
Th ese new outlets mus t be built i n areas convenient to suburban 
residential cen ters and not on the ir old main street locations. 
Today it is an established f a ct t i:lat large city stores with 
bran ches i n the nearby suburbs do more business than stores 
wi t hout branches. Let us examine t h e exact nature of these 
~t 40, p. 113 
~H<-9, p. 311 
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new branch stores and shopping centers of t h e suburban 
areas . 
C. Branca Stores 
Th e branch s t ore can be defined as an extens ion 
of the parent store into another area?- whe t her that location 
-,(· 
be a mile away or across the cou..ntry. It relies on the 
parent . f or top managemen t advice , guidance, an d policy ma1dng , 
but ha s its o"n s t ore manager . 
The branch store movemen t began in the 1920's when 
t h ey were small versions of the big city store, carrying a 
very limited amouht of stock . Th e life of these early 
establishments were often short-lived, as the depression of 
t he 30's saw ma_:1y of them close . T'ne depre ss io~1 reduc ed h ome 
building and restricted the f low of population to the 
suburbs . Earnings had been steadily falling with costs increas-
ing, and department s t ores were forced to concentrate their 
efforts on t1e main stor e. Worl d War II brought increased 
population to t he larger cities but government control of 
r esidential construction and commercial building made l arge 
scale operations of branch store s impossible. Fifteen year s 
v ent by before this movement could pick up where i t left off 
in the 1920's. 
Today the branc store is an essential part of 
retailing . Department stores still expand and management has 
many possible alter na tives in considering suburbru1 operations 
~- 18, p . 18 
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and locations. Many of the modern branch stores are more like 
sister stores than off-shoo t s of t h e main concern. Th ey are 
often referred to as affi liated stores , having t heir own 
ma.:lag e 1 ent team, separate merchandising staff, distinct name 
ru1d an individualistic character. Alth ough not all of these 
new outlet s are in the suburbs , recent trends have bee_ i n that 
direction . However , very large city department stores often 
h ave br~nches within the urbru1 area. 
D. Shopping Centers 
11 T ·o stores , side by side, have always 
under a free enterprise system, done more 
than t wice the business of a single store. 
Every merchant in the world realized the 
value of the CL~ulative pull: it is implicit 
in every Main Street, every Fifth Avenue, every 
crossroads store group . 11 "'~ 
The shopping center i s the modern day application 
of this principle. It is a group of retail stores with 
nearby parking area that operates under the theory of t h e 
cwnulative pull. It differs from the traditional main 
street of autonomous stores in th;: t t he cen t er is developed a s 
a unit and plan~ed to fulfill the n eeds of the population 
which it serves. A survey in 1955 estimated that there are 
1,100 shopping centers in operation and that 2,200 were 
being built or plarmed. 
" *''" 
Three t ypes of shopping ce 1ters are generally dist-
-3(-i(-* 
inguish ed from one another . (1) The neigh borhood cen ter 
-;~1 , p. 4 
-;H~l9 , p. 6 
-X--lH(-28, pp • 17-18 
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h ic(l is comprised of t en to f i f teen f ood and conven i ence goods 
stores, with pa rking space for about 500 cars. ( 2) The 
Comm1L.YJ.i ty Center with t wen ty to fo r t y stores and parki ng f or 
1000 cars . This type of center usually cont ains a junior 
depar t meEt store. (3) Regional Shopping cent er which attempts 
to offe r compl ete one-stop shopping and to satisfy t e retail 
ne ed s of an entire ar ea. It contains a branch of a maj or 
department store, which is t he core of t h e center, a site 
of 30 a cr es or mor e , and parki ng f or 1,000 to 10,000 cars . 
It needs at l east 100,000 f~1ilie s to support i t , and t he 
tra ing a r eas may extend f or as mucn as 20 miles . In i t s li s t 
of tenants are supermarkets, women 's ear and men 's wear 
~hops , sh oe stores, h ardware stores, r estauran ts, banks an 
theatres. 
The depar tment store is usually s itua ted so that it 
will be t he "puller" f or t he other s tores. If the depar tment 
store i s not located so that the oth er s tores will benefit from 
t he f oot traffic to and f rom its do or s, one of t h e mo st 
valuable points of t h e center will be lo st . 
Originally toe department stores rented space in 
t he shopping center. As later many of t -1e stores did n o t 
approve of t he way i n wD.ich the center -,.as be i ng manag ed. 
Th ey fe l t t hat t h ey were i gnoring an excellent opportun i t o 
per sonally capitalizing on t h e sh oppi ng center. The r e came a 
period i n v,h ich many of t he l a rg er depar t ment stores developed 
t r1 ei r own shopping centers. Exampl e s of this are Allied 
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Stor es i-orth gate Pr o j ect in Seattl e , Hech ts in Virginia, and 
Macy 's i n New Jersey . In the f ollowing chapters we shall 
t ake a clo se lool{ at t he various wa-y s of fin an cing these 
proj ects an- t he pros a:.r1d cons of these arrang emen t s. 
E. Effe c t s of Bran ch Op erations 
Figures ar e no t avail abl e f or branch store opera-
tion s as an isolated group. Comparisons mus t be bas ed on t he 
op erating statistics of departmen t stores with and without 
branches . According t o t he work done by Profe ssor Malcolm 
McNair , t he nurnber of branche s in operation has i nc r eased 
steadily i n the l ast seven years .* Department stores with 
20% or more of t h eir sal e s i n bran ch e s showed t h e best volume 
i ncreases . This sales growt h may be explained by t h e i n c reas-
i ng numbe r of new branches opened and t h e tr end t oward su bur ban 
l iving . However , in 1956 t h e n on-branch operating s t ores 
h ad increa ses in sale s t hat were greater t han tho se Vlhich. t h e 
main s tores of branch operating firms were abl e to obtain . 
Future stu_die s of operating r e sul t s of branch and non- branch 
operating stati stic s may reveal that t he case f or conc en trating 
e f f orts on a singl e store operation may h ave grea t er merit t han 
is now generally thought to be the case. Thi s argument stand s 
up when viewing the prof it results. It is striking that there 
is no cl ear p erc entage earni ng s advantage in branch store 
-><- 2 2 , p . 49 
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op eration. Concerns with branches generally show h i gher 
gross margins t han sing le-u:..rJ. i t enterprises, but this 
advan tage is cancelled out by t he h igher total expense 
per cen tage. 
Table IV 
Eff ect of Branch Op er ations, 1956 Op erating Results 
Departmen t Stor e Sales $10 Million and Up 
Results in % of Net Sales in O~ned Departments 
Gr oss Ma rg in 
To t al Expenses 
r et Gain Before 
Fed . Income Tax 
No branch es 
in 1956 
36 . 2 
33 .7 
6.1 
Less than 209~ 
branch store 
sales in 1956 
20% of more 
branch stor e 
sales i n 1956 
Sour ce: Malcolm cNair, "Op erating Results of Depar tment 
and Specialty Store s in 1956", Bureau of Busines s 
Research , Harvard University , p . 48 . 
It doe s not appear from the agg r egate fa c t s that 
department stores sh ould or will give up their maj or 
dovmtown uni t s, even t hough the volume of sales has decreased 
substan t ially. The operating results of t hese sto r es compare 
very favorably to branch operations. Because dovmtov.n stores 
are dr awi ng a good volume of business and represent sub s tantial 
capital investments, these units are too valuable t o s a crifi ce. 
The problem is prin cipally one of declining sales. To meet 
this issue, marlY retaile rs invest l a rge amounts of caui tal 
in th eir paren t s tore in t he hope o f stimulating business . 
In the future we shall probably continue to see 
departmen t stores with a combi nation of centr al store s i n t h e 
19 
metropolitan area an d grouping of brru1.ch e s i n the suburbs. 
The question of how many units can be op erated profitably and 
where these units should be located will have to be dec ided 
by t h e i ndividual department stores. 
20 
Chapter II 
ANALYSIS OF OP .li;RATI:t-J G RESUL'fS 
.A. Sales 
In t h e past, sal e s of d epartmen t stores have tended 
to fluctuate with the total e conomy. Howeve r, the general trend 
o f dollar runoun t of sal e s i n the past ten years h as been upward . 
Th e Harvard Unive rsity Bure au o f Business Research report s t h at 
1 956 sale s f or dep artmen t s t ores were 25.3% above the 1947-49 
average. 
Table V 
Department Store Sales Trends, 1947-1956 
Owned Departments. Index 1947-49= 100 
1947 98 . 2 
1 948 103 . 3 
1949 98 .5 
1 9 50 104.8 
1951 106.6 
1952 108 . 7 
1953 110.0 
1954 112 .6 
1955 119.4 
1956 125.3 
Source: alcolm McNair, "Operating Results o f Department and 
Specialty Stores in 1956", Bureau o f Busine ss Research 
Harvard Un iversity Bulletin 149, 1957, p. 2 , Table 1. 
At first glan ce it would seem t hat t h i s rise in sales i ndi cates 
a general advance in t h e position of department stores in our 
economy. This un5rtunately is not t he case. As comp a r a t ive 
f igures sh ow, there has been a decline since World War II in 
t he sta tus o f the depa rtment store i ndustry. In the mid-
f o r ties these merchants obtained 8. 3% o f t otal r etail sales, 
60, ' \vhereas in recent years th e ratio was about %. 
~t-
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Department stores today are conf ronted with new 
competitive pressures . Manufacturers in t heir selling efforts 
emphasize turnover in place of makr-ups, and encourage the 
growth of low cost di s tribu tors such as discoun t h ouses and 
warehouse stores. These types of outle ts h ave low overheads 
~nd moderate selling expenses. Department stores have felt the 
comp etition, since t hey are traditionally high ma.rk-up and high 
cos t i stitutions. On expensive items t hey are subj ect to severe 
price competition from discount operators. In addition, f or 
most of' the year s in t he 1947-56 period, department store sale s 
did not increase at a pace equal vvitb t hat of t he varie ty stores. 
For the entire period 1947-56 departm ent store sales have n ot 
kpet pace with t he volwne i ncreases of the l eading mail-order 
-~-r, 
chain companies, e.g., Sears Ro ebuck and Montgomery Ward . 
Another form of competition has come from the supermarkets. 
Super markets are low cost, low margin institutions. With 
their gross margins squeezed to not more than 17-18%, t here 
is a di stinct advantage in retailing ntunerous staple items of 
low unit value at a 25% mark-up , commonly marked-up by the 
department stores a t 35-38%. Many of the traditional 
department store line i tems are now seen on the counter s of 
sup ermarkets. Department stores have failed to keep their 
sh are of the con sumer dollar. 
*18, p. 8 
-lH~-22, pp. 14-15 
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The rising dolla r volume of department stor es 
mu s t also be viewed in t he ligh t of disposable i n come. Sale s 
dep end primarily on t he l evel of salarie s an d payroll, 
and i n p articu l ar , on take-home pay . The grim f act is 
t hat t h e ri s e i n department store sales has not equaled the 
ri s e i n di sposable i n come. R~at i s t he reason f or this? The 
gr owt h in d isposable income of t h e averag e American and t h e 
ri se in h is standard of living have given birth to a different 
pat t er n of consumer spending. The consume r is cur rently 
s eeki ng i mprovement in his automobile and other consumer 
du rable s and services. So long as t h is tren d con tinu e s we 
cannot expect an automatic r evival in the apparel r e tail-
i ng fi el ds, expe ct in years of consi derable business down-
swi ng . 
The inc reas e s i n t he dollar amount of sal es have 
n ot been su :ffi ci.ent to maint ain t he compar a tive s tat us of 
t he department s t ore i n t he r etailing i ndu str y and in t h e 
e conomy. This i s due to ch ang es in consumer spendiD.g patte rns 
and n ew comp etitive pre ssur es. To f i gh t these dangers , 
dep artmen t stores are ba ttling t o increase their volume 
t h rough subu rban expansion i n to new out lets. They promot e 
product line s for suburban living such a s garden equipment 
and outdoor furniture in t h e hope that these branch stores 
will h elp to r es tore t h e departmen t store to its f ormer 
position. 
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B. Gross Margin 
Ac cording to a study by Malcolm McNair, gross 
marg i n a s a percen tage of net sale s h as vari ed between 35-
36~% over the last ten year p er i od . Hi s torically this marg in 
has ranged from a low of 34.4% in 1929 to a high of 39 .9% 
* i n 1942. In order to understand fully this margin figure 
and to avoid confusion between the two , we mu s t dis t inguish 
between i ndu s trial an d retail accounting methods. Industrial 
accounting distinguish es three major co st components: materi&, 
l abor and overhead. Ynese t hree el ements are included in 
t h e cost of goods sold . In r etailing, however, the co st of 
merchandise sold is far different, a s it includes onl y one 
of the three component s: material. 
X Comp~ny-Retail Income Statement 
Gross Sal e s 
Less: Cash Discounts to Customers 
Returns and Allowances 
Net Sales 
Co s t of Goods Sold 
Gross Margin 
Expenses 
Ne t Pr ofit 
Since me r chandi se costs are determined by manufacturers, t h e 
cost of material cannot be r educed unless t he store ch anges 
t he quality of goods i t sells. But t he t :rpe of materials 
purchased can and doe s influence the gros s margin. Mark-
downs are i ncluded in deter mi ning t h e gross margin . If the 
* 18 , p. 42 
Table VI 
Personal Consumption Expenditures As A Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, 1946-1956 
Total Durable Goods Non-Durables 
Goods Autih Furn., Clothing 
& Total Total & House Total & Alcoholic 
Service Goods Parts Furnishings Other Shoes Food Beverages 
19LJ6 92.1 63.1 10.0 2.5 5.4 2.1 53·1 11.5 25.4 5·3 
1947 97·6 67·3 12.2 3·7 6.5 2.0 55·1 11.1 27.0 5·1 
1948 94.7 64.5 11.8 3·9 6.1 1.8 52.6 10.5 26.3 4.2 
1949 96.0 64.0 12.5 s.o 5-8 1.7 51.5 9.8 25.9 4.1 
1950 94.1 62.6 13-9 6.0 6.3 1.6 48.7 9.0 24.7 3-8 
1951 92.2 61.1 12.0 4.8 5.6 1.6 49.1 8.7 25.8 3.6 
1952 92.0 60.1 11.2 4.4 5·3 1.6 48.9 8.5 25.8 3·7 
1953 92.0 59·5 11.9 5·3 5.1 1.5 47.6 7·9 25.2 3.6 
1954 93.0 59-0 11.5 4.9 5-l 1.6 47·5 7·7 25-3 3·5 
1955 93·9 .59-8 13.2 6.3 5·3 1.6 4d).6 7.6 24.8 3·3 
1956 92.7 58.2 11.9 5·1 5.2 1.5 46.4 7·5 24.6 3-3 
Non-Durab1es{cont2 Serldces 
Gas 
& Total 
Oil Tobacco Other Services 
1946 1.9 2.2 6.9 29.0 
1947 2.1 2.3 7·5 30.4 
1948 2.3 2.2 7.1 30.2 
1949 2.5 2.3 6.9 32.0 
1950 2.4 2.1 6.6 31.5 
1951 2.5 2.1 6.4 31.0 
1952 2.5 2.2 6.2 31.8 
1953 2.6 2.1 6.2 32.6 
1954 2.8 2.1 6.1 33·9 
1955 2.8 2.0 6.1 34.1 
1956 2.9 2.0 6.0 34-5 
Source: Survey of Current Business, }~y 1957, Vol. 37, No. 5, p.10 
Clement Winston ana Mabel A. Smith, Pattern of Buying of Consumer Goods, p.9=14 
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firm make s unfavorable purchases , it must take losses from 
excessive mark- downs . The buying functi on influences both 
t h e price at which the goods are purchased and the price at 
which they are sold. 
Top gross margin figures are usually found in 
department stores with the l argest volume. Conversely, the 
l owest gro ss margins are found among t he smaller stores, as 
t heir t ype of business is of ten typical of small general 
merchandi se store. 
Table VII 
Departmen t Store Gross Margin 1956, By Size Group 
Percent of net sales in o~med departments 
Stores with Sales of : 
Less than $250,000 
$250,000 to $500,000 
$500 , 000 to $1 million 
$1 mill. t o $2 mill. 
$2 mill . t o $5 mill . 
$5 mill. to $10 mill. 
$10 mill . to $20 mill . 
$20 mill. to $50 mill. 
$50 mill. and up 
32 .1% 
33 . 6 
34 - 5 
35 .L!· 
36 . 5 
36 . 3 
36 .o 
36 .4 
36 .6 
Source : Malcolm McNair, "Operating Re sul ts of Department and 
Specialty Stores in 1956 11 , Bureau of Business Re search, 
Harvard University Bulletin 149, 1957 , p. 9 
C. Expenses 
Department stores nave s een a steady rising of 
t heir expense rate. In t he past ten years , it has i ncreased 
from 30 .1% of n e t sale s in owned dep c.utments to 33 . 75%, while 
during the same period gross margin ha s only gone fr om 35 .4% 
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to 36 .4% . ~~ This rising pattern of expenses was h al ted 
for a while in 1954-55, bu t in 1956 the upward movement 
began once again. 
Of' t he department store exp en ses, payroll is by 
far t h e largest cost factor. The root of t he issue s t ems 
from t h e movement of prices and wages in relation to one 
another . In the pe riod 1948-56 hourly earnings in depart-
ment store and mail order establishments, adv~~ced 38 . 2% , 
-while the depa rtment store price index i n the nine year 
u eriod rose only 5.51b. Inflation since 19,4.8 ha s pushed 
up salaries at a much faster rate than prices. Although 
t he wage scale has ri sen, department stores have been 
confron ted with sta tionary productivity of workers. As 
a result some mechanization and automation has been i ntro-
duced in an effort to cut these mounting co s ts. 
The int roduction of automa tion, especially into 
clerical op er ations, would help to overcome some ser i ous 
problems. First, it would cut dovm on the growi ng nurnber of 
wor kers, and secondly, it would all eviate t h e difficulty of 
constantly changing personnel. With the ever growing payroll 
costs and the di ff iculty passing the se costs on to t he 
consumer, because prices are r egulated by competition, t h e 
introduction of mechanical equipment offers the department 
-~- 22 , p. 2 
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Table VIII 
Average Hourly Ea.rn~pgs: 1946-1956 *, Retail Establishments 
Year All Retail All General Merch. Department Stores & 
Establishments** Establishments Mail Order Est. 
Dollars Index Dollars Index Dollars Index 
1246-100 . 1946-100 1948-100 
1946 • 876 100 • 728 100 
1947 1.039 118.6 .867 119.1 
1948 1.088 124.2 .910 125.0 .991 100 
1949 1.13.7 129.8 .950 130.5 1.040 104.9 
1950 1.18 134.7 .98 134.6 1.09 109.9 
1951 1.25 142.7 1.03 141.5 1.17 118.0 
1952 1.32 150.7 1.07 146.9 1.21 122.1 
1953 1.40 159.8 1.11 152.5 1.25 126.1 
1954 1.45 165 .• 5 1.15 157.9 1.29 130.2 
1955 1.50 171.2 1.18 162.1 1.32 133.2 
1956 1.57 179.0 1.24 170.3 1.37 138.2 
* Figures for non-supervisory employees ~nd working supervisors. 
** General m.erchandise st~Dres, food & liquor stores, and 
automotive and accessories dealers. 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statisti<?s, Monthly Labor Review 
Table . IX 
Department Store Inventory Prices Index, January 1947-1956 
(JanWilry 1941-100) 
1947 
1948 
1949 
-1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Source: 
180.5 
182.3 
173.5 
189.6 
191.1 
188.6 
189.2 
186.8 
187.9 
192.3 
McNair, Malcolm, Operating Resulbs of Department and 
Specialty Stores in 1956, Harvard University, June 
1957, p.l6,_ Table 6 
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store t h e possibility of reducing long-run operating 
co sts . 
The major disadvantage is t hat medium and small 
stores cann ot justify the rental or oVvnership of this 
equipment because i t is too exp ensive commensurate with t he 
inf ormation thus obtained. Department store profit marg i n s 
are lower than those of manufacturing concerns. In addition 
t h e stores prefer not to add to t heir fixed charge s, a s they 
must make quick adjustments- to the shifts in the tides of 
consumer buying. Though automation promises to cut retailing 
costs, most stores sti ll rely on the more conventional me thods. 
Several po s sible solutions to this problem have 
-ht!.-~ 
been discussed in other i ndustries. Cooperative data 
processing centers might permit a small store to ge t togeth er 
with othe r stores a...'l.d support a central electronic data 
processing system. Another alternative would be t h e devel-
opmen t of priva tely operated service bureaus. These bureaus 
could serve several i ndustries. They would offe r equipment 
for short periods of time to small and medium sized firm s at 
prizes they could afford to pay. 
Other i mportar:.t · expenses among the natural divis-
ions of department store expense s include r eal estate costs 
and advertising, which currently runs about 2.75~b of net 
-)~ 4'2' p. ll6f 
-)H~41, p • 1 
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sal e s.* Oth er signi ficant expense s i nclude taxes (except 
on real restate) 1.1%, i mputed i ntere st (except on real 
estate) 1.4%, suppli e s 2.05%, purchased service s 1.9% and 
other expenses all less than 1% of sales. 
Table X 
Department Store Total Expenses 1956 by Size Group % of net sales in owned 
departments 
Department stores with sales of: 
Less than $2 50,000 
$250 ,000-$500,000 
$500,000-$1 million 
$1 mill.-$2 million 
$2- $5 million 
5-$10 million 
·.10-$20 million 
'il)20- ·:50 million 
$ 50 million and over 
31 . 8% 
32.0 
32 . 7 
33. 8 
33.7 
35 .0 
34.5 
34.1 
33.2 
Source : Malcolm McNair , "Op erating Results of Departmen t 
and Specialty Store s in 1956 11 , Bu r eau of Business 
Resear ch, Harvard University Bulletin 149, 1957 , p . 9 
Tota l expenses in rel ation to departmen t store 
volume are low at both ends of the volume scale and high 
i n the middle. Below t he one-half million dollar volume 
classification t ypical expense rate of 32% of net sale s is 
characteristic. These enterprises are clo ser to the 
general merchandi se stores than department s t ores in that 
they incur lovver costs because they perform less comprehen-
sive functi ons. Above th is lo-w·est volume l evel, the rang e 
of total expense percentages is not wide. V\ihen comparison 
-*22 , p. 2 
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is confined to stores with sal e s above the $1 million mark , 
the lo·;, est (or equally low) total expense percentage has 
consiste:::1tly appeared f or the top volurue group , since 1954. 
It is not probable tha t the exp lan ation lies in sheer volume 
alone. The l argest s t ore s are the most a ctive in asso-
ciation activities, in researct.t, and also emp loy t he top 
retai l executive tal ent. 
An English study foUl~d t hat a given department 
store can r each a size which i s too large for effici ent 
~~ 
manag em en t. 
This maximum size i s r eached when the 
balance between economie s of l arge scale 
production, which a re es sentially advan-
tages gained by spli t ting processes of 
production into specialized operation and 
growing co s ts and difficulty of effectively 
co-ordinating all these processe s as t heir 
number increases. 
'fh e sta tistics f or United Sta tes department stores shmv 
tha t expense s in r el a tion to sales decline wi th an increase 
i n volw.11e. Largeness appears to lend effi ciency to co sts as 
well as to manag ement ~~d l eads us to the conclusion t hat 
economie s of scale prevail in the department store f ield. 
In fact tne smaller stores could improve their op e ratj_ng 
results by increasing t heir volume. 
D. Earnings 
UnfortUl~a tely, t he growt h of expenses h as b een 
greater than t h e rise in gross margin , anci as a result 
-*10, p. 91 
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depa r t men t s t ore s h ave h ad a lovv operating profi t . T e 
Harvard Universi ty Bureau of Bu s iness sResearch r epor ts t hat 
p r of i ts have ranged f rom 2 .1-2 . 7% of n e t sal e s i n t he l a s t 
f ew years . Operat ing prof i t mar gi ns compu ted f rom raw 
data compi l ed i n t h e "Sta ti stics of Income" f or r etailing 
general mer chandising a r e a ppreci ably higher. 
Table XI 
Operating Margins i n Reta il Gen eral Me r chandi s i ng Es tabl i shments 
1950-1954 
19 50 
6 .41% 
1952 
6.51% 
1954 
6 .19% 
Source : Computed f rom dat a pre s ented i n U.S. Intr~rnal 
Revenu e Ser vic e , "Stati stic s o f I n come", Wash i n ;;:, t on , 
D. C., 1950, 1951, 195 2, 1953 , 1954 
Th i s d i f f e r en ce i s pri n cipally du e t o t he use o di ss i milar 
te chni qu e s of measuremen t and di f f eren t s runpl e s. 
Sinc e this l .::;vel of op er ati ng i n come i s so low, 
o t he r n on-operati ng i ncome is an i mportan t f a c t or i n t e 
final profit showi ng o f departm~nt s t or e s . Other income 
i n clude s credit of i mput ed i n teres t , n e t i n come fr om l eased 
depa r t men ts, and the ca r ryi ng c arge s on cu stomer ac coun t s. 
Th e l a s t of t te se t vvo i t ern s vve h ave r ese r ved f or spe cia l 
at t en t i on i n t h e f ollowi ng chapters of t h is paper. 
Ne t ear n ing s bef ore t ax h a s sh own a good i mprove-
ment i n ti~e l ast f ew yea r s. Th e 1956 h i gh of 6 .05% of n e t 
s a l e s e qualled t he top p er f ormance of 1950. 
i'<" 22 , p . 2 
" _ ...,_ 
-"'-" 
This i mpr ovement 
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in department store pre-tax earn ing s stemmed from n on-operating 
activities rather than from the direct bu siness of buying 
&1d selling merchandise. 
The size of the department store has a direct 
e f fect on its earni n gs. Large stores consisten tly show 
sup s rior earning performance , ~Jvnen judged in percen tage 
t e rms . In 1956 , the percen tage earn i n gs befor e tax for 
s t ores with sal e s of $ 50 million or more was t h ree times as 
high , as stores with n e t sal e s under $250, 000 . 
Table XI I 
Department Store Operating Prof i ts , Net I ncome Before and 
After Tax-1956-By Si ze Group-90 
Net Sales 
(thou&_ 
Less than $250 
$250- $ 500 
$ 500-$1,000 
$1,000-$2 , 000 
$2 ,000- $5,000 
w5,000- $10 ,000 
$10,000-$20,000 
$20 ,000-$ 50,000 
$ 50,000 or more 
Operating 
Pro f it 
0 . 3 
1. 6 
1.8 
2 .0 
3.0 
1.6 
2 .05 
2 . 8 
3 .75 
Other 
Income 
2 .0 
1.8 
1.5 
1.4 
1.9 
2 . 2 
2. 55 
2 . 8 
2 . 85 
Net bef . 
tax 
2 . 3 
3-4 
3 . 3 
3.4 
4.9 
3.8 
4.6 
5.6 
6 .6 
Tax 
# 
# 
1.1 
1.4 
2. 3 
1.85 
2. 3 
2 . 75 
3. 25 
Net Profit 
After Tax 
# 
# 
2 . 2 
2 .0 
2 . 6 
1.95 
2.3 
2 . 85 
3.3 5 
Source : Malcolm NcNair , "Operating Results of Department 
a:.n.d Sp ecialty Stores in 1956 11 , Bureau of Business 
Re search , Harvard University 1957 , p. 9, Table 4 
#not available 
Clearly then, there are some economies of scale i n run-
ning a large ou t f it. Big stores can generally aff ord to 
attract t op executive talen t. In a d( ition, their l a rge size 
puts them in a goo d buying position. They are abl e to bargain 
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f OI' better te rms by virtu e o f t h e size of t heir or ders . 
Furt h er i or e , t h ey have a t ype of inte r nal i n surance op erating 
i n t h ei r favor . Si nce t he l a r gest store s carry su ch a huge 
variety of i t ems , if on e lin e of trade di e s out , it will 
of ten be compensated by appearan ce or exp an sion of o t her 
-r, 
l ine s. 
Of course t h e l arge r percentage ear n ing s by t h e 
gi an t stor es a re modifi ed t o some ex t ent by taxe s. For all 
depar t men t s t ores this f i gure wa s 3.1% in 1956 and 2. 85% i n 
-~-~ 1955 . These f igure s are con s i derabl y above special t y stor e 
ear n ings which ran 1 . 6% and 1. 55% r e sp ectivel y f or t h e la s t 
t wo years . It is per h ap s t he bright point i n t he depart-
men t store outlook , t hat n e t earning s , perc en t ag e- wi se , have 
shown a decidedl y upward t rend f r om t n.e 1951 l ow to t h e 
p resent . 
Al t hough t hese before and af t er t ax ear ning s have 
i mpr oved, t he retu r n on dol lars i nvested has no t been a s 
favorable . Accordi ng to Harvard's s t u dy , 1956 f i gure s of 
r a te of r e t urn on capi t a l s t ock an d surplus were bel ow tho s e 
of 1955, pre-tax r e turns being 14~ 5% and 1 5. 5% . After 
t ax r a te of r eturn sh ovv ed this sa.11e declin e , from 7 . 5% i n 1955 
to ? . Ofb i n 1 9 56 . Best r a t e s of r e turn v:ere i n t h e l arge st 
vol ume groupi n g , as wa s true rith earni ngs . This points t o 
->~10 , p . 86 
-lH~22 , p . 9 
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t h e advantages of large scale op eration s previously men t i on ed . 
The E arvard study, h ovrever , gives a slig"L::.tly di s t a rted pi c tur e 
as n o rat e of r e t u r n wa s figured f or groups with sale s of l e ss 
thru1 $500,000. Th e Harvard data must be compared to material 
pre s en t ed i n t h e "Statistics of Income". Acc ording to t he se 
f igur es, t b. E: r a t e of r e turn on net -v orth after t ax Vf'as rela-
tively s_ aller f or all general merchandising retailing outf its , 
ranging from 3. 08% i n 1950 t o 5. 68% i n 1954. 
1950 
3.08 
1951 
5. 66 
Table XIII 
Return on Net Worth Retail General 
Merchandising Es t ablishments, 1950-1954 
122.2 
5.06 
.l2..i4 
5.68 
Sour ce: Computed fr om data presented in U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service , "St a tistics of Income", Washington 
D.C., 1950 , 1951 , 1952 , 1953, 1954 
In ano th er survey by Roy Foulke, the median r e tur n 
on dep a rtment store investments f or 1955 was 5. 80%, based 
" 
on a sampl e of 404 department stores. -,..- Rate of return on 
i nvestment i s l es s f or depa rtment store s than f or oth er 
retail lines. 
In order t o analyse these earnings f igures, we 
mu s t determine what f actors effect the operati ng and earnings 
performax1ce of dep artment stores. Let us examine how t h e 
rate of stock tur n and the markdown effe ct these r e sults . 
-*16 , p. 
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Figures show that the faster t he stoclcturn, the 
larger the gross marg in. Final r e sults show t hat the 
h i ghest stockturn group has the highest net operating profit 
and t h e lo-;;est stockturn group has the lowest op erating 
pr ofit . 
Table XIV 
Depart 1ent Store Stockturn-1956 By Size Group 
Dent. Stores with 
Net sales of : (in t h ous.) 
Less t h an $250 
$250-500 
~6 500-1,000 
$1,000- 2,000 
$2 ,000-5,000 
~~5 ' 000-10' 000 
$10,000-20 ,000 
$20,000-50,000 
$50,000-and over 
Stock turn 
Common Middle R&~ge 
2 .7 
3 .2 
3.4 
3 .85 
4-15 
4- 3 
4-35 
4-5 
5.0 
2 . 24-3.15 
2 .59-3 .92 
2 .84-4. 28 
3.21-4.37 
3 .66-4.63 
3 . 82-4.67 
3.98-4.70 
4.17-4.93 
4-37-5.66 
Source: Malcolm McNair, "Operating Results of Department 
and Sp ecialty Stores in 1956," June 1957, pp. 58-65 
In 1956 stockturn for department stores with business of 
$ 50 million and over vvas 5.0 and net profit wa s 3.4%. Stores 
with s al e s w.J.der $250,000 had sto ckturn of 2 . 7 a.YJ.d n e t op er-
ating prof it of .3%. The largest stores turned their 
s t ocks almost tvice as fast as the smallest one s. Since it is 
m . established fact that stockturn is almost invariably more 
ra:· id in large stores than small ones, we are not sure if high 
prof its result from the l argene ss or from faster turnover. 
In another study , effects of the stockturn were 
-* 
separated . Department stores vve r e group ed according to 
•'f-10, p. 98 
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their stockturn and n ot t heir volume si ze . This study 
shm;ed t hat t h e lower t he stockturn, the lower t h e p t=..: rcentage 
of expenses , r a ther t h an t he larger t he gross margin. 
Table XV 
Effect of Stoclcturn on Operating Results 
Dep artment stores with a rate of stockturn of : 
Less than 2 t;i.m§§ 3-:2 !2 :times !:J: t;imes & 
Average rate of 
Stockturn 2. 7 3.4 4 . 8 
M&.rkdo ms 7 .4 6 . 5. 6 . 2 
Gross Margin 33 .3 32.6 33 . 6 
Total Expenses 32 . 6 31 . 8 31 . 2 
Net Profits 0.7 0.8 2.4 
Source: Brant Pasdermadjian, 11 The Department Store" , London, 
Nev~an Book s, 1954, p . 98 
Final re sults show t hat the highest net profit was i n t he 
r ap id stockturn group and vice-versa. This rapid stockturn 
fu1d h igh profi tability are associated with the l arger 
stores. 
over 
The ef fect of markdowns on op erating r esults should 
be evalua ted . The lowest rate of markdovm is f ound in the 
h i ghest stockturn group and , similarly, in the h i ghest 
i~ 
net op erating pr ofit group. These r e sults are dependent 
on size groupings and t hus do not r eveal the true effects 
of mark-downs. 
A study trying to isolate the effects of t h e rate 
of markdm·-vn on operating results disagrees with the above 
f i n dings. Whil e t h e gross margin and expenses ri s e as 
t h e rate of markdo~n increa ses, highest n e t profit was f ound 
in the middle group. 
*22 , pp. 58-65 
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Table XVI 
Effect of Department Store Markdown on Op erating Results 
Department stores with rate of markdovm of : 
Le~s than 2~ 2-:Z ~ :ft~ :z . 2$ aud over 
Average rate of 
Markdovvn 3. 8 6 . 4 8 . 3 
Gro ss Margin 32 . 7 33 . 6 33. 9 
Total Expenses 31 . 5 32 . 1 32.5 
Net Prof it 1 . 2 1 . 5 1.4 
Source : Hrant Pasdermadjian, "The Department Store 11 , Newman 
Books , London, 1954, p . 100 
The author suggests the explanation f or thi s may be due to 
several f actors . The largest markdown group may have 
weakness in mer chandisL11g an stock control. The group 
with t he smallest markdown does n o t n ecessarily signify 
greater merchandi s ing skill , but "an abnormal compositi on 
of t h e trade and too great a weight on staple merchandise or 
too crude operati n g me t hods with an exaggerated rigidity 
* of markup . " We must conclude that markdovms do not have 
a clear-cut influence on operating resul t s . Markdowns 
must be considered in the light of t he ini tial pr icing policy 
of ea ch department store . 
In the l ast years there ha s been a decl i ne i n the 
status of department stores . In general t hey ll.ave failed 
to k eep their share of the consumer's dollar both in the 
retailing industry and in t he total economy. Rising expenses 
have squeezed pr ofits . Higher expense s are principally due 
to increase s in payroll expenditures as the consequences of 
-*10 , p . 100 
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i nfl a tion . Since the gross margin has not i ncreased at a 
rate equal to the ri s e i n exp enses, total operating pr ofi t s 
have been small. Other , non-op erating income i s beginning 
to play an essential par t in department store operations. 
In the following chapters we shall discu ss the t wo most 
i mportant of these factors, credit and l eased depar t ment 
operations. 
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Chapter III 
bHORT TERM PROBLEMS OF FINftl~ CIN G HE'J:AIL CREDIT 
A. Tren ds in Retail Credit 
Con swner credi t in itself is a major growt h 
area f or Ameri can f inanc e and has exp ande d greatly i n the last 
decade . Today credit is almo s t an es sential part of mode r n 
day retailing . 40% of all retail trade is conducted on a 
credit basis and 58% of departmen t s t ore sales are made on 
~~ 
credi t . 
Since t here wa s no retail cr edit reporting agency 
in t h e United States before 1869 , no i nformation is available 
on its earliest u se . When the National Retail ·r edit 
Association wa s organized in 1912, it wa s e s timated t h at 13% 
of all retail sal e s were credit sales. Tne concept o f 
credit was entirely different from what i t is today. Cr edit 
at t hat time was considered a privilege of selec t custome rs . 
J'J erchants extended credit to their fr i ends and to weal t hy 
members of t h e community . Strangers r arely requested credit 
and the bulk of retail busine ss was conducted on a cash 
basis. Merch ants had no way of checki ng on the debt-paying 
ability of members outside their immediate community. On 
the oth er hand , in modern retailing practice, credit is viewed 
~~12 , p. 327 
-lH~7 , p. 595 
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a s a posse ssion of almo s t all custome r s. It is tier mercha~ t ' s 
job to "sell creditn so that the customers will buy mo r e at 
his stor e. 
In 1956 t he dollar amount of ch arge a ccount s in 
department s t ores was more than three &""ld one hal f times 
what i t was i n 1939. "Though t h e total doll a r amount of 
ch a r ge accoun t s has increased , t h e % of departmen t s t ore 
s al e s on credit has re ained essen t ially unchanged ." 
Table XVII 
on-I nstalmen t Cr edi t (Charge Accounts) Held By Depar t en t 
s tore s, i n Millions of Dollars 1936-19 56 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1945 
1948 
1949 
195 0 
1951 
19 52 
1953 
1954 
19 55 
1956 
236 
251 
275 
217 
290 
575 
587 
650 
698 
728 
772 
793 
862 
895 
Sour c e : Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1955, and Feb . 1957 
Th is gr o t h i n charg e a ccount revenue proceeded a long t wo 
lin e s. First, a large r propor tion of r e t ailers is ex tendi ng 
credi t an ct , secondly, ~redit is extended in larger amounts. 
The dollar amount of credit sale s h a s shovm great expansion. 
The se changes have aff ec ted many small r e tailers. Th ey f ind 
"'*"22 , p. 2. 
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t hat t h ey cannot compete wi t h t he l arger chain s t ores. 
They are often unabl e to cope with the credit problems a s 
t -1ey lack the funds, t h e organization and t tle borrowing 
capacity . Department store s op erating under very severe 
comp etition h ave been f or ced to extend credit in order to 
stimulate or maintain their share of consumer sales . 
B. Types of Credi t 
There are t h ree broad t yp es of t ime and credit 
sal e s programs that h ave been used by departmen t stores : 
t h e regular charge account, t h e deferred payment account , 
~~d t he i nstallment sale . 
Th e cha rge accorn~t is t he traditional book account 
where the customer is free to make as many purchases as h e 
wan t s a.iJ.d pay fo r them at the end of the 30 day peri od. No 
specific charge is made for this t ype of credit , m~d costs are 
absorbed i n t h e over-all expense of the firm . Bills are 
ctue upon pre sentation . In pr actice , however , t h ey are 
outstanding from 45 to 80 days . The average age of receivabl e s 
f or r e tailing-general merchandising group has been about 70 
day s for the 1951-1954- period . 
Table XVIII 
Age of Receivable s-Retailing-General Merchandising , 1951-19 54 
.1.2.2 
75 . 6 
.12.5.2 
71. 6 
.1.2.i4 
76.7 
Source : Computed from raw data pre s ented i n U.S. Internal 
Revenue , "Stati stics of Income", Washington, D.C., 
1951, 1952 , 1953, 1954. Credit sal e s were computed 
from percmtages compiles by the Harvard Bureau of 
Business Research . 
-)i- ? n... Rl 
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Th er e i s some indication that r etailers are not strict in 
t he enfor cement of t h eir terms of sale, and this l axity may 
be a cause of h i gh credit costs. 
The deferred account i s in reality a f ormalized 
exten sion of t h e payment period of the 30 day charge account. 
Th e se accounts require weekly or monthly payments, usually 
over a t h ree to six month p t:;riod. There are t wo di fferen t 
t ypes of deferred accounts, the coupon account and the 
r evolving credit account. 
The coupon account was t h e f i rst f ormalized plan 
f or the sale of soft goods by installment. Under t h is 
method customers are gi ven script or coup ms which can be 
exch ang ed for merchandise. Stores adopted this techni que 
becaus e i t allowed them to control credit extension, while at 
t he smne time gave them t h e protection of t h e conditional 
sales contract. Coupons mu s t be paid for before any mo r e 
are i s sued t o t i1ecustomer, thus setti ng up credit limits. 
This t ype of· credit account h ad many drawbacks, and i t ha s 
gradually been repl a ced by o"(ner deferred account syste s. 
Customers were required to r e turn t o t he credit off ice 
to r enew t h eir supply of script when t he original amount 
was exhausted . This created both h igh operating costs and 
h igh account mortality a s customers resented t his inconvenience. 
Secon dly, reg-u lar monthly ins tallment pa;ylllents we r e r equ i red 
to pay f or the coupons, whether or n ot t h e customer had 
pur ch ased anything. Customers were a l s o dissatisf ied with 
this asp ect of t e p r ocedure . La stly, t h e psych ological 
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reaction ras to make the coupon carri er consider h imsel f 
an i n ferior risk, which he was , when sh opping with a compa:.n. i on 
who h ad a r egul ar charge ac count. 
The revolving credit accoun t ha s come to be wi dely 
acc epted t oday , because it avoids mruLy of t he difficul tie s 
c :r."eated in t h e coupon account . The cus tomer is given a 
line of credit equal to t he amount he can affor d to pay 
monthly multiplied by t h e number of months in t he pl an . 
For example, i f a custome r can f inancially afford to pay $35 
a month , on a t hree month plan, t h en he can charge and ovle t h e 
stor e $10 5 permanently, c._s lon g as he cont inues t o pay $35 
p E:r montn . The store cover s par t of it s co s ts of extending 
credit by char ging 1% servi ce charg e p er month on the out-
standi ng balance. This t ype of account combine s t he a dvan tages 
of t 1e continuous charge a ccount and t i:1 e pr ivi l ege of i ns tall-
ment payments . It has been readily accepted by department 
stores in t il.e pa st years. Tvvo-thirds of t he larger ciepartrnent 
stores offe r ed a revolving credit plan i n 19 55 , comp a r ed to 
-~­
t wo f i f t hs i n 1950. 
~nile t he regul a r charge account is principally a 
convenience method, the installment accoun t i s far di fferent . 
When customers purchase on i ns tallmen t credit, t hey n e ed to 
buy t he good s on time. I f t h ey are no t given these t e rms they 
must postpone th eir purchase or may never afford to buy at 
all . While r egul a r open a ccount terms are sh ort and s t an dardized , 
?f- .39 , p. 1 .314 
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i n s t allment acc ount s can run f or y ears . Heavy carrying charge s 
are impo sed on t i1ese accounts vs . no carrying charg e f or open 
accou.Yl.ts . Department sto r es sell goods on straigh t i nstall ment 
contracts i n much t he sarile way automobiles are sol d , but 
camouflage t n is under desc r i ptive , promo t ional titles . Certain 
departments of department s tore s suci.1 as j ewelry , f u rniture 
and appliance s do a l arger pe rcentage of their sale s on an 
in s tal l ment basis t han to other departments . The se are gen-
erally t h e units that sell h i gh ticket items . Art i cl -e s sell-
i ng f or over a minimwn amount may be purchased on time , and 
t he customer s igns a conaitional sales contract or a c attel 
mortgage . 
Over the past ten y ears the percen tage of department 
store sales by ins tallment and other term a ccount s ha s been 
steadily rising. I n 1947, 6 . 5% of sales were made t hrough 
t h is f orm of credit , in 1951, 9 . 5% , and h i. 1956, 13. 0%. 
Table XIX 
DBPABTilil~NT STORES-P.t:;HC.fi;i~TAGE SALBS BY 'I'EH.MS 0 i ' SALE, 1947-1956 
C. O. D. Regular Installment & Oth e r 
Year Cash & Layaway Charg e Term Accounts 
1947 42. 0 8 . 0 43 . 5 6 .5 
1948 40.5 6 . 5 Lt-5 .0 8 . 0 
1949 39 . 5 6 . 5 46 .o 8.0 
1950 37 . 5 6 . 0 46 .5 10.0 
1951 37 . 5 6 . 0 47 . 0 9 . 5 
1952 39 . 0 
1953 37 . 5 
1954 39 . 0 
1955 37 . 5 
1956 36 . 5 
5. 5 h,.7 . 5 9 . 0 
4 - 5 48 . 0 10 . 0 
4· 5 47 . 0 10 . 5 
4 -0 46 . 0 12 . 5 
h- . 0 46 . 5 13 .0 
Sour ce : Me -air , Malcolm, Operati ng Re sul t s of Department and 
Sp ecialty St ores in 1956, June 1957, p • . 2, Table I 
45 
Regu l ar charg e account sale s have i n creased , but not so 
rapi dl y , f rom 43.5% in 1957 to .LJ-6 .5% in 1956 . At t h e same 
t i me , department store s have wi tnessed a de cline i n their 
ca sh cus tomers f rom 42% to 36 .5% in 1956. Vvnat doe s this me an 
f or t he dep artment store of today? It signifie s t hat credit 
t e r ms are becoming increasingly more i mpor t ant and dep a rtmen t 
store s are being f orced to comply wi th t h e comp etition. 
Credit is a powerful promotional tool and a 
great stimulus to sales. Customers wi t h charge accounts usually 
give their trade to a limited number of store s, whereas a 
cash customer will sh op around to find t he best bargain. 
St a.tistics prove tt1e importance of credi t as a selling device. 
Stores with credit sal e s are nearl y three time s as large in 
sales volume a s a re t h e stores i n an area wi t h only cash 
* sales. The l arger stores are able to get f unds at a lower 
ra.te than the small ones. It is easi er f or t hem to extend 
credit. In the case of depar tment stores the situation is 
such t hat 83% of su ch stores with credit sales are on t h e 
average n early f ive times as large as those on a cash basis. 
Credit also attracts a better class of cus t omer s. 
It has been found th a t the h i ghe r t he income level, t h e 
l a r ger the propor t ion of purch ases t ha t a re made by credi t . 
In reali ty it is not so much the l evel of income but the 
expectation s of future i ncome that de t er mines credit customers. 
If a customer f eels that his income will ri se in t h e f uture , 
h e will be more anxious to purch ase on credit. People wan t 
-i(-2 , p . 76 
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con venience and service and credit is a positive tool f or 
providing t his s ervice. Customers can order on t he ph on e or 
return merchandi se with gr eater ease than is other wise 
po s sible . On t he other hand, f or t h e lower income bracket 
individual, credit, and in particular installment t ype 
purcha s es , enabl e s him to en joy his i ncome bef ore it i s earned. 
Credit has a broad appeal. 
C. Co st s o Credit Operations 
Th ere are certain problems and co st s inherent in 
credi t opera tions tha t a departmen t s tore mu s t r ecogni ze and 
h andle. The f oremost deterrent i s tha t credit increases a 
store's op erating co s ts. Accounts r eceivable and credit expen s es 
as a p ercentage of' n et sales in own ed departments of department 
store s ran 1.9% in 19 56 and 1.75% in 1955. -l~ 
In the process of extending credit the departmen t 
s tore i n curs certain costs. It i s mor e expensive to handle 
i nstallment sale s than cash . On what basis should one de cide 
what costs are to be included in t h e cost of credit? I n our 
analysis we include only t he co s ts directly a t t ributable to 
t h e credit f unction. The proportion of overhead allo cated 
t o t he credit func tion will be overlooked. No aggregate 
st c:~tisti cs are available f or co s t an alysis on su ch a basis . 
There are three major costs of gran ting credit; 
payroll of personnel, losses fr om bad debts , and intere st 
cos ts on funds t hat are tied up , or borrowing costs i f ou t side 
f i n an cing i s required. 
-~22 , p. 2 
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Table XX 
Co sts of Credit in Depar tment Stores, 1 956 in Percent o f 
Net Charge Sales 
Net Sales Payr oll, Acctts 
(th ous) Rec. & Credit 
500-1,000 
l,000-2,000 
2 ,000-5 , 000 
5,000-10,000 
10,000-20,000 
20 ,000-50,000 
50 ,000-and over 
1.3 
1.4 
1.2 
1. 2 
1.15 
Losses frm. 
Bad Debts 
.4 
.3 
. 25 
.3 
.35 
.1~5 
.35 
Int. on 
Acct. Rec • 
• 75 
.8 
.85 
1.1 
1.1 
1.05 
1.1 
Ave • .A.R. 
Outstanding 
19.0 
20 . 0 
21.0 
27.5 
27 .5 
26 . 0 
27 .5 
Source: 1vlalcolm McNair, " Operating Resul t s o f Department and 
Sp e cialty Stores in l956n, Bureau of Business Researci.l. , 
Harvard University Bulletin 149, June 1 957 , pp. 58-65 , 
Tables 23 , 24, 25 
Payroll costs would include the sala ries of personnel 
wh o perform the book-keeping work , collect overdue account s, 
and i nvestigate new a ccounts to check on their cr edi t worthiness. 
I n percentage o f net credit in 1 956 , t h e payroll costs f or 
credit and accounts receivable ranged from 1.15% to 1.4% among 
t he various volu~e group ings o f department sto e s. Th e se costs 
were g ene rally loFer for t he l arger volume firms. These pay-
roll costs are an i mp ortant factor, since our economy in general, 
and t h •e d epartment store in particular, is faced with mount ing 
salarie s in t ne ligh t o f inflation. It is likely t hat t h ese 
expense s will continue to rise in years to come. Unl ess the 
price ri s e is proportional to cost increase s, grru1ting credit 
will become an e ven more exp ensive proposition . 
Losses f rom bad debts are generally higher f or 
i n s tallment acco~~ts t h an regula r charge accounts. Th is is to 
be expected since t he risk of the tim e period involved is 
much greater. Despite popular belief to the contrary , they 
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are of n o great i mportance in contr i buting t o t he h i gher costs 
of ins tallment as compared to ch~rge account credit . 
Lo sses fr om all bad debts ranged i n 1956 from . 25% of n e t 
credi t sal es i n the $2-5 milli on grouping of the department 
store s to a h igh of .45% in the $20-50 million sale s bracket. 
In all categor i e s they are below t he traditional rule of thumb 
cr iterion of ef f i ciency of i of 1%. 
The interest co s ts on ~~1ds tha t are t i ed up are 
usually computed at the going in t erest rat e s of the day. 
Actual ly it would be more ac curate to compute these costs as 
oppor tlli'l.i t y co st s or what tne department store s coul<i have 
re ceived from these f unds i f i nvested elsewhere. If coll ~ ction 
te r ms are l engthened as a re sul t of more i nstal lment credit, 
v.h ich appears to be the modern trend, t h e co st of carrying 
these accounts is increased, a s money i s t i ed up f or longer 
periods of time . I f money co st s are h i gh, as was true in 
19 55, 1956 and the f irst hal f of 1957, it will be more 
expens i v e f or t h e department store t o borrow funds to f inru1ce 
t hese cr dit sal es . In 19 56 inter es t costs rm1ged fr om . 75% 
of ne t creO.it sale s f or stores wi t h sales of $500 , 000 t o $1 
million and t o over 1% f or all groupi ng of department stores 
wit sal e s over $5 million. 
A r e tailer rs f inan cial req~irements iill be increased 
to t h r deg r ee thc:tt e extends credit to customers . Typically, 
a depa rtment store or retail establishment as more fund s 
*7, p . 705 
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tied up in account s receivabl e than a merch andising firm . 
The f'ollov.ri ng is a comparative picture of funds ti ed up in 
accounts receivable and inventorie s f or all manufacturing 
concerns, f or retailing , and f or retailing's sub-division, 
general merchandising . 
Table XXI 
Inven t or y and Acc ounts eceivable As Percentage of Total 
Assets f or all Manufactu ring , B.etailing , and Retailing-
Gen eral Merchru~dising 
In ven to r ;y: .l.25.Q .l.2.5.l .12.52. 
All manufacturing 23 . 6 26 . 3 26 . 8 
All r e tailing 34 -4 37 .o 34. 7 
Re tai ling- Gen eral Mercha:.r1dise 31 . 6 35 . 1 Not Available 
Accoun t s Receivabl e 
All manufac t ur i n g 12 . 7 1.3 . 4 14. 3 
All r etaili ng 20 . 1 19 . 3 20 . 1 
Re tailing-General Merchandise 20 . 9 18 . 9 .fot Available 
Sour ce : Compiled from data pre sented i n t he Federal Trade 
Commission an.d Securitie s & Exchange Commission , 
Quarterly Financial Rei)or ts , "U . S . Retail and vVholesale 
Corpor ations" and nu.s . Manufac tur ing Cor porations" , 
1950, 1951 , 1952 . 
Retailing and its sub- division percentage s are much nigher 
t han manufacturing . 
The curr ent ratio position of retailing- general 
me r ch andising i s quite h igh . 
Table XXII 
Curren t Ratios-Retailli~g-General M srch~ndising 
19-50- 1954 
1952 
5. 73 
1954 
6 . 27 
Sour ce: Comput ed fr om data pre s ented i n U. S . Inter nal Revenue 
Servi ce , "Stati s tics of I n come " , Wash i n gton , D. C. , 
1950 , 1951, 1952, 1953 , 1954. 
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This pictur e is disto r ted by se a sonal factors affecting t h e 
retailing industry . Since Christmas i s the bi gges t sea son, 
inveLtori es and ac counts receivable judged fr om a balance 
sh eet taken a t the end of t he year will sh ow inventorie s even 
lorver t h an usual and accotmts receivable h igher. From t he se 
calculations it does not appear tha t department s tores h ave 
a liquidity problem as much as a cash problem. When depart-
ment store mon ey is tied up in i nventory and accounts r eceiv-
able, it can.no t be i mmediately converted i n to cash. Ye t t he 
store n eeds funds to pay its bills and pressure is put on the 
cash box t ha. t n e cessitates season al loan s to accommodate 
t h ese peak periods. The f inal quarter of t h e yea r is t ne 
most i mportant and recently accounted for 35.6% of annual 
" 
sal e s, November and December alone ac counting f or 26% . '' 
D. Sh ort Ter m Financing 
A maj or sour ce of funds come s from net earning s 
from operations, but trade payable s, bru~k loans, and oth er 
liabilitie s aid in this f inancing . Not all credit sal e s are 
financed directly by the retailer. A large p art of t h e 
fun ds to f inance these credit transactions are acquired from 
outside sources. The retailer may obtai n funds by borrowin g 
from commercial banks, t h rough sale s finance comp ani e s or 
t h r·ough factors. About 4b% of consumer i ns tallment indebtedness, 
excluding automobiles and personal loans, is h el d by f i n ancial 
ins t itutions. 
-~- 56 , p. r. 97 
Table XXIII 
Composite Sources and Uses of Funds Statement, Retail Trade 1946-19.5.5 
1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 
Sources of Funds 634 401 278 349 490 628 202 271 LJJ9 740 
Net from Operations* 330 284 258 241 241 339 273 349 310 296 
Trade Payables 72 21 -29 23 -19 101 -17 -17 23 68 
Banks Loans,short term .50 -4.5 - 5.5 -1.5 -3 17 4 10 -13 29? 
Bank Loans, long term 40 -37 -11 -24 234 -16 -2 - 3 6 4 
Accrued Fed. Income Taxes 31 -16 -1/.j. .5 11 184 -.57 22 11 -4.5 
Other em~rent Liabilities 57 -4 - 2 25 46 81 -6 16 39 29 
Mortgage,bonds,other liab 34 120 60 35 39 18 14 50 39 -27 
Preferred Stock -14 10 .5 42 20 .5 -3 4 2 76 
Common Stock 14 22 
Other Sources** 21 46 16 17 1.5 9 
Cash -60 -60 
Marketable Securities -33 -.50 
Uses of Funds 634 l.+lJ!nl 278 349 490 628 
Plant & Equipment Exp. 293 27.5 184 14.5 2.58 228 
Inventories 266 47 -67 46 36 286 
Receivables 172 131 -94 1.57 170 103 
Cash 
-36 -80 186 -60 
Gov 1 t Securities -82 19 64 33 
Other Assets 20 9 4 27 26 11 
4 
8 
-16 
202 
21.5 
-73 
.54 
4 
8 
-116 
-.52 
271 
197 
-19 
77 
17 
0 
-·11 
132 
439 
214 
82 
11? 
26 
3 
64 
243 
740 
1.12 
509 
103 
16 
* Net from operations- includes net profit after tax plus current depreciation less cash dividends paid 
(non-recurring charges and credits have been eliminated from net income) 
** Other Sourees - includes proceeds from sale of fixed assets and investments, tax refunds and 
extroardinary sources of funds. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1946-.56 
.50 a 
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Tabl e XXIV 
How Tot al Ins tallment Credit Market is Shared Dec . 1955 
Othe r consumer goods , (excluding retai l automobile, repairs, 
modernization loans and personal loans) 
Comrneri cal banks 
Sa l es f inance compan i e s 
Cr edit Unions 
Oth er f inancial inst. 
- To t al financial inst. 
Department stores (incl. 
Mail Order) 
Fun~iture sto~es 
Hous ehold appliance stores 
Oth er r e tail ers 
- To t al retailers 
Total 
Amount 
000 , 000 
2,099 
416 
95 
349 
2 , 959 
1,423 
956 
297 
800 
3476 
6, .L~3 5 
% Di stri bution 
E'in . Inst . Total 
70 .9% 32 . 6% 
14 .1 6 . 5 
3 . 2 1. 5 
11.8 ~ 
100.0 ~ 
22 . 1 
14. 9 
4 . 6 
1 2 . 4. 
~ 
100 .0 
Source : I r ons , Watrous , and Bellemare, Dou gl a s I:i ., 11 ommercial 
Cr edit and Collection Practicen, New York , Ronald 
Pr ess, 19 57 , p. 597 
Commerica1 bank s a re t h e mo s t important .sources 
of sh or t t e r m finan cing, having about 32% of t h e installmen t 
c:redi t mar ket. Short te r m bank loans finance 2-31~ of t h e 
assets of t he retail- general merchandising group. In 
gen eral, department stores begin to borrow sometime i n October , 
-)H~ 
and loan s r each t h eir peak t oward t he end of Nobember . 
The se loans will be l iquidated in J anua r y as r e turns come 
in fr om Christmas purchases , and by the end of January , 
department store seasonal loan s should be r.epaid • . n the 
spri ng t . e r e is rutother demand for seasonal funds . Depar t ment 
s t ores borrow i n Febur ary O I' Mar ch and pay out these loans 
by the n ci of May . 
-:h':-18 , p . 70 
Commercial banks also play anoth ~r i mportant 
financing role . Some stores sell part of their deferred 
payment account s d.irectly to the bank . These sal e s are 
usually on a n on-recourse basi s and a pe rcentage of the 
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proc eeds of such sale s is retained by the bank . Banks have 
entered i nto pl an s to take o•ler the en tire credit r e spon sibility 
of store s. When customers vlish to charge a purchase at the 
store, t h e retail e r calls the bank f or authorization. At 
t he end of the day merch ants sen d their sale s che cks to 
t h e ban_"k showing all sale s made dur ing t h e day. The amotmt 
of the se sales less a brolk ch ar ge of 5-8% is credited to t h e 
retail ers a ccount . All payments on contracts are made 
t h r ou gh t h e bank, not the store s. Thi s last t ype o f plan 
is usually beneficial t o t h e small retailer s who cannot 
afford to op erate on credit. 
Sales f inance compa~:i e s account f or 14% of t he 
f i n an cing of consumer i n .s tallment credit . These firms are 
priva te corporations wh i ch originally financed solely i ns tall-
ment sale s in t h e automobile industry . In t h e l ast decade 
these compan i e s expan<ied their op erations to ot h er h i gh-
priced items as r e fr i gera tors, ·wash ing mach ine s and ot her 
h ousehold utiliti e s. The se companie s pu r chase retail e r s' 
i n stallment sale s cont racts on a notificat i on basis, and take 
care of the f inancing of t hese accom1 t s receivable. Accounts 
may be sold with or without recourse . I f they are sold on a 
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non-re course basis , and the custome r defaul t s on payment , the 
sale s f inru1ce company merely repos s esse s its ovm ms rchandi se . 
If s olei under a recourse meti:10d, repossessed merch an di se is 
returned to t h e r e tailer , who in t u rn rei mburses t h e 
f i n o.nce company on a previously ag reed-on basis . Excep t in 
a few sta t e s, i nstallment sales con tra ct rate s are not 
controlled by l egal limitation and t h er efore are de termined 
by competition. Rela tively hi gh rate s of inter es t are cha.rged 
b e cause of high op e rating expense s i n such financing .* 
Modern factoring involves a cont inuing 
agre ement under Vihich a f inancing i n stitution 
assumes t he credit an.d colle ction functi on 
f or its client, purchases h is r eceivables , 
as they ari se wi t hout r e corse to h im f or 
credit losses and be cause of t h is r el at ipu-
sh ip perform s other auxiliary functions.'\--"-
This i s the way one auth or defines factoring . 
It i s to be di 1'fe rEn tiated from ot h er f orms of finan cing in 
t hat i t s op er ation s are confined to open-account transactions. 
Factors do not deal with installment sale s as do sal e s 
f i nance compani e s. In additi on , factors a ss"Lmle t h e en tire 
credit and collection funct ion f rom credit granting to t ' _e 
collection of accoun ts . The factor a ssmne s all respo·~l sibili t y 
f or bad debt los ses and t hus asswne s all risks involved . 
By factor i ng its accounts re ceivable a department 
store will limit its credit and coll e ction op er a ting exp ense 
and avoid any ne ce ssity of i n curri ng long- t erm p e r manent 
debt to f inru1ce thi s function. The cost s involved are based 
on t wo component s : (1) a fee f or p er f orming t he credit and 
coll ection fun c t ion and (2) purcha sing of accoun ts rece i vable 
-*3 , p . 604- 5 
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on a n on- recourse basis . In judging whe t her factor i n g would 
be beneficial to any particular department store, t he cost of 
handl i ng t h e credit and collection work i tself must be comp ared 
to factor i ng cos ts and the cheaper alte rnative adopted. 
E . Carrying Char ge s 
Up to this point we discus s ed t h e costs of granting 
credit and the met hods of f inancing t he s e receivables . We 
n ow turn to i nc ome derived from this source . A point of 
dispute f or many years has been whether a direct charge 
for credit is justifiable ? Some merchants f eel that credit 
charge s should be absorbed i n t he pr icing of merchandi se . 
Under thi s pro cedure cash customer s are f orc ed to pay in 
part f or c redit transactions . Anoth s r limitation i s t hat 
de-oa rtment stor es cannot mee t comp etitors' prices if t h i s 
additional mark-up is placed on t h e selling price of 
goods . For t he department store already confron t ed with 
s evere price comp etition fr om discount h ou ses, t h is would 
tend to make its disadvan t age even more pronounced . On the 
o t f.t ·CJ r hand , i f ch a rges f or credit are separated and called 
to t h e a ttention of the buyer, he may re sent paying t h is 
added charge . 
Today most departn ent store s compromi se betw.: ?en 
t he s e t wo extremes. T:.rJ.ey charge for l ate payment of accounts, 
but have n o direct fee f or t b e normal 30 day c'1arge acc ount . 
Customers have accepted thi s policy , and ad jus ted to such 
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ci:la rges as a re sult of revolving credi t a ccount s vv-nich i nclude 
1% charg e f or extended payment . By a dding t h is i' ee , depo.r tmcn t 
stor es i:lope t o adhere to their traditi onal 30 day terms 
mor e clo sely . Date ch arg e s r ange from ~ to 1% monthly an d 
are tacked on t o all balru1ce s of $25 or more out s tanding 
on charg e accounts due i n more than 90 days. 
Table Y..:X.V 
Depa.rtment Sto r e Income fr om Car rying Charges 
1956 
In percent of net sale s in owned department s 
Ne t Sales (thous) 
$ 500-1,000 
l, 000- 2 , 000 
2,000- 5, 000 
5, 000-10 , 000 
10, 000- 20, 000 
20 , 000- 50 , 000 
50 ,000 and over 
Carrying Cha.rges 
Common Mi ddle Range 
.1 . 00- . 13 
. 2 . 00- . 38 
.45 .16- . 62 
. 85 . 35- 1. 23 
. 85 . 36- 1.1 2 
1.15 . 73- 1. 63 
1. 2 • 86- l. 56 
Source: Malcolm Nl cNai r , 11 0p erating Re su lts o · Departrn8nt 
an d Specialty Stor es i n 1956 11 , Bureau of Busi ness 
Res earch, Harvard University Bull ,3tin 149 , J une 1957 , 
pp. 58- 65 , Table 23 , 24, 25 
In 19 56 i n come from t h - se carrying char ges ranged as ·cligh as 
1. 2% of n 0t sales f or the largest category o department 
store s. These stores wi t h the greatest sale s volume have 
t h e l arges t income f rom carrying charge s. The co s t o f credi t 
i s of fset t o some degree by the income from carryi ng chcrge s 
on accoun t s. This income is ver y sign ificant since depart-
ment stores operate on su ch a low n e t op erating profi t. 
In summary , we have s een t he tremendous grov.·t h of 
credit i n t h e retailing economy t h rough the past years, 
stemmin g from its value a s a promotional tool and as a stimulus 
*12, readi ng 43 , p . 329 
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to sale s. We examined t h e importance and op eration of t h e 
di fferent f orms of credit : cha rg e ; deferred; and i nstallment 
accounts . The co s t of credit operation s was anal yzed and 
VIi t h i t the short t erm liquid. i t y an d cash po sition of ci epar t-
ment s t ore s . In conn ection r ith t h e seasonal strai n on cash 
we i nvestigated several po s sible f orms of financing open to 
t he sotre s . Lastly, we consi dered carrying cha rges as an o f f-
s e t t o t he se costs . Credit is of ever incre asing impor tan ce 
i n depar t ment stor e operations . Both its costs and revenu (j s 
ar·e of great significance i n de termining the f inal earn ing s 
picture for department store s . 
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Chapter IV 
LEASED DEPAHTl\ii~TS IN DEPAHTMENT STORES 
Revenues fr om l eased department operations are 
an i mportant contr ibution to department store n e t earnings. 
Profits on l ea sed departments ran from . 4% to . 65% of n 2t 
sal e s i n the 1956 various volrune groupings of department 
stores . 
Table XXVI 
Depa rtment Store Income From Leased Departments 1956-In 
- Percent of Ne t Sales In Own ed Departments 
Ne t Sal e s (thous) 
$500-1,000 
$1,000-2 ,000 
$2 , 000- 5, 000 
$i5 ' 000-10,000 
$10, 000- 20 , 000 
· ~2 0 ' 000-50 ' 000 
$50 , 000 and over 
Prof it on Leased Departments 
Common Middle Range 
. 25 . 00- - 49 
. 55 .14- . 98 
. 45 .06- . 70 
-4 .17- . 74 
. 65 .35- . 86 
. 6 . 26- . 83 
. 5 .21- . 86 
Sour ce : Malcolm :N eN air , "Operating Results of Department and 
Specialty Stores in 1956 ", Bure au of Business Research, 
Harvard University Bulle tin 149 , June 1957 , pp . 58-6 5, 
Tabl e s 23 , 24, 25 
Though t h ese figures app ear to be mi nute , it will be recall ed 
t hat total operating prof its were 2 . 6 5% of n e t sal e s in 
19 56 . Othe r income ( 3 . 4%) was a decisive f actor i n rais-
ing after tax earning s. Since t h is r evenue is so essential , 
t h e maj or questi on i s whether or not department leasing 
pays . Woul d i t be more profitable for t h e depar tment store t o 
ovm and operate all its departments or to continue to l e ase 
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them? In th i s chapter we shall try to answer t h is question 
of l ea s ing . First , h owever, we must define a l eas ing depart-
ment and i t s operation . 
Depar t ment l s a sing i s merely the operation of a 
department of the store by an ou t s i de indi vidual or f i rm . 
The l e ssee i s a merch ant wl.1o bears t he r i sks of runni ng 
t he department i n the hope of receiving prof i t s. The title 
to t he merchandi se belongs t o h i m as doe s the i n come from 
t he department . Vfui l e the store i t sel f recei ve s a rent al 
income from the l eas ed department , i t f oregoe s the r i ght of 
obtaini ng me r can t i l e profit s from the depar tmen t . The l essee 
control s all of the merchandi sing acti vitie s of the depart-
ment fr om buyi ng mer chandi se to selli ng i t . Sometimes restrict-
ions are i ns er t ed in the l easing contract limi ting t he se 
activi t i ::: s. For exampl e , a common clause provi de s that 
the department store pass on all sel l i ng p er sonnel of t h e 
department . The l e ssee operate s under t he name of the 
department stor· e and t~'lere fore gets the benefit s of the 
standing of the s tore i n t h e corrunUl'li t y. The contrac t s 
usually run f or on e year , but i n certain department s they a r e 
f or longe r p eriods of t i me . The se contract s are self-
r enewi ng and continuous. They ru:..'l. i ndefi n t e l y until t e rmi n -
ated by either par t y and carry a 30 , 60 , or 90 day cancellation 
~­
ca l u se. 
*13, p. 19 
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Wh a t are t h e advantag e s and disadvantage s claimed 
in l ea s ing a departmen t ? Let u s look at some of t h e t ypical 
argumen t s. 
Th e advantages to the lea sing organi zation are 
obvious . They have a ready- ma de mar ke t upon op ening of t h e 
department. If t he same firm started a s an i n ciependent store 
uni t , i t would take time · to build up a cl i en tele, and even 
t h en t h e drawing po ten tial of f ered by t he other dep a r tmen t s 
vould be n on-existent . The l easing firm can also benefit 
from t h e economie s of size of t he department store . In 
r egar d t o over head items , such as light , h eat , credi t or 
delive ry , t h e l eas ed dep artment must pay on l y its shar e and 
thus can minimize the se overhead co sts . Since t he depar t ment 
s t ore itself atten ds t o these functions, t he sp eci alized 
per sonnel of t he l ea sing department i s fr ee to concentrate 
i t s at t enti on on t h e s elling angle o f t h e bu s i n ess. 
On t he oti1. e r hand, these advantage s a r e n o t open 
to t h e l eas i ng f i r m without their drawbacks. Th e mo s t 
i mpor t<m.t of these i s the r i sk taken t hat t 1e contract may be 
cancelled by t he depa rtment store on rel a t i vel y short n otice . 
I f this o ccurs t e l e s see is l eft stranded . There is n o 
good will to be transferred a s the department operated in 
the n ame of t h e stor e. An ot h er problem is t h a t t n e departmen t 
mu st conform to s t ore-wide policies i f t h ey are t o r e tain their 
concessi on . All factor s con s i der ed , th e l e a sing f i rm i s of f -
ered many advan t a ges t hat woul d n o t o ther v-i s e be po ssibl e . 
60 
The claimed advantage s f or t he department s tore 
in l easing are not a s de cisively i n favor of t his poli cy 
a s wa s true f or t he l easing f i rm . Leasi ng provides t h e 
depar t men t store wi th sp eciali zed ability ar1d speci ali zed 
a t tention . For thi s r ea son the depar t ment s most common l y 
l eas ed ar e t. ose whi ch require this exp ert attention . For 
example, the beauty salons and phot ographic studios cannot 
be r un by r egul ar s ales f or ce s . They r equi re skilled 
p ersonnel. Speci ali zation i s also of value i n t h e mill i ne r y 
department where rap i d fa shion change s make continuou s con t ac t 
-..vi t h the ma.l{re t e s sential . All of the ma j or department s 
l eased requ i r e a specialized staff . 
Leasing also p ermit s a department s t ore to try new 
line s of merchan.di s e at a mi n i mum risk, since t h e major por tion 
of t h e r isk is i n t he hands of t he lea s ing f i r m. The final 
argQ~ent advanced is tha t a store , wish i n g to expand i t s 
op erations more rap i dl y thru1 i ts capital ru1d resource s p ermit , 
can enter i n to an expansion progr am on the bas i s of leas-
L'1.g n 2w departments . 
By l easing , the department store automa ticall y 
set s a limit on the profit s i t ca11 gain f rom t 1e department . 
Tl.1is i s p er haps the mo s t ser ious drawba ck , a s a department 
store is in bu sin es s t o make money , n ot j ust t o con t i nue 
to e:xp and operation s at a mi n i :a1um re tur n . The department 
stor e , l ike any o t he r business e stabli shmen t , wants to 
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invest i n th ose projects t hat will give t h e dep a r tmE:nt 
store t ne h i ghes t rate o f r e turn fo r its investment . 
I n a l eased department survey , contri bution 
pe rcentag e s f or o-vmed departments were comp 2.red vvi til comm-
ission rate s on ti:1ese same departments whi:m t1ey were l eased . 
Below vv-e h ave presen t ed the i'i gur es f or the most commonly 
leased departments . Th e return f or sel f -operation is 
substantiall h i gher t h an l easing retul~ns i n many of t h e 
department s . 
Table XX."VII 
Op erating Statistics-Leased Departments an Ovmed Departn1ents 
1951 
Rate of Commission Op erated as Ovmed-% of n e t sal e s Contribution p ercent 
of net sales 
Median Rang~ M~dian Ra.nge 
~ illinery-expensive 18 . 0 15 . 0- 22 . 5 26 . 8 12 . 6-34. 8 
:tvl illinery-inexpensi ve 18.0 15 . 0- 20 . 0 29 . 8 23 . 9-33 . 3 
Beauty Salon 18 . 0 12 . 0- 25 . 0 26 . 9 19 . 9- 31 . 0 
Pho t ograph ic Studio 15.0 14 . 0-25 . 0 n one r eported 
Sew·ing l\I.Ja cr i e s 17 . 5 12 . 0-20 .0 12 . '7 11 . 4-18 . 8 
Lendi ng Libr ar y 1 5 . 0 10 . 0-Lj.O. 0 16 . 8 L 21 . 5- 34 .1 
Watch Repair 18 . 0 10 . 0-25 . 0 14. 5 00.0-30 . 2 
Shoe Hepa i r 16 . 0 10 . 0-2 5 . 0 6 . 3-23 . 6 
Opti cal 20 . 0 10 . 0-30 . 0 29 . 1 35 . 0- 40 . 0 
Vacuum Clean er s 15 . 0 9 . 0-16 . 0 14. 7 L 1 2 . 2-19 . 6 
vJ illiner -ba sement 18 . 0 1 5 . 0-24 . 0 2$ . 1 1 3 . 0-36 . 3 
Source: Controller's Congress of the National Retail Dry 
Goods Association, Philadelphia Retail Controller's 
Association , "Leased Department Surveyn , Second 
Edition, 1952, N. Y., pp . 10-11 , Table 1 
Th e se s tatis tics may be in t erpreted in t wo ray s ; first , 
fran t h e figures presented, i t would seem mo s t profitabl e 
to o n and operate t r1 e f ollowi n g customaril y l eased dep art-
ments : millin er y , beauty salon , a.nd optical departmen t s . 
Deuart ne _ stores t hat l ease t h ese .epal~tment s are giving up 
some po ten t ial pro _:_·i t t o t h e lessee . They sacrifi ce this 
profi t be cause t e rentor i assumi n g the risk of pote ~ ti al 
lo ss . T e econd expl an tion rna) be t h at store s V/~~i c · op erate 
their o ~o:n departments are mo.2 e prof i table establishments . 
T 1e l ess pro f itable firm s ·woul d l ease out depa rtments because 
at the outset t 1 e~ could not malce a r ea sonable r e turn on 
t i:1e i r investment . 
It has been maintained t hat t h e specialized person-
nel i s not c.vailable f or department s t ore employmen t and t a t 
t he cap ital i nvestment i n i nventory is not p r ofitable . I 
personnel i s available t o a l easing f irm i t shou l d be avail able 
to a departmen t store . Similarl y , i f t he lea sing f irm 
mak (:: s a prof i t on i t s investment i n i nventory ( a..nd obviousl y 
t ·J.ey do , or t~ey vvoul d n o t continue to l ease) t h en it seems 
logical tha t d.epar tmen t s t ore s cou l d reap t he sar.1e benefits 
r om t ne se i_ve s t ents . 
Otners cont en~ t 1at t h e wo r~ 1 of t e 1 ased depart-
Lent i s n ot only in monetary prof its but in fi lling a emand 
of t he customers f or these add d servi ce s . This rna inciee 
be a va id ar ument . 
We con clude that i f t h ese added departments are 
eithe r pro 'i tabl e or n e ces s ary to customer sati sfaction, t h ey 
snou l d be i u ded in the department store oper ations . If 
-~-1 , p . .51 
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depa rtment stores can successfull y O\'VTl and op erate an y o f 
t~1 e se d.epartments a t a l arger retur-n than is p o ssible from 
l easing , t hen they mo s t c ertai n l y sh ould attempt to do so . 
I n t he light of t he survey 1 s findings , a furtl1 e r lool{ i n t o 
t h e po ssibil i t y o f OWili n g some of t he se l e a sed departments 
is indicated . Le aseo. departments do n o t alvmy s pay . 
Chapter V 
lVE'rHODS OF LONG ~'~Rllil FH1LNCil 1G 
Wi t -c1 t h e trend t o·ward subur ban.ization an u t h e 
expan sion of department s t ores i n branch ou cl e t s , an important 
probl em of department stor es is f i n ancing t hese n ew uni t s . 
A. Depa r t men t Sto r e Rentals 
Th e i rnpm:·tru""J. ce of con t l' a cting r easonable r ental 
ag re emen t s can be st be seen t h rough h is t or ical f i gu r es . 
During t ~ e depre s s s ion v1hen income wa s fal ling f i xed ren t 
-)~ 
char ge s amou11t ed to 25% of gross income in some i nstances . 
The se rents Vc" ere cont ract ed i n pro sp erity and became ruinous 
burdens as t h e r e cession took hold . The disadvantage of 
a long t e r m f ixed rental contract compa r ed to a percentage 
l e: a se is now appar en t t o t h ese victims . 
1. Percentage Lease 
Under this t yp e of contractual arrangement t h e 
amount of r ent varie s with t he arnount of income , e i t h ;:3 r gross 
or n e t , or v.ri t h the total sales volwne. W11.e the leasing 
pri ce is a percentag e of gro s s volume , agre em ents some t i111es 
provi de f or r eductions in t h e p E:. rcentag e , after sales 
ex ceed c..:i.'l agr e ed-upon maximum . This l atter t yp e of arrange-
melt is often un derstandably preferred by tenants and is a 
common f orm of leasing device wit.a t h e l a r ger s t ores. A 
max irnwn clause is justif i ed as t he landlord's investmen t does 
-l*- 24 , p . 11 
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not r ise as sales incr ease . The dep artmen t stor e may be 
payi ng ext r a l a rge promotional fees to stimula t e this added 
volume . On the oth er ha11.d , the ovmer of the center , has a 
dire ct interest i n t he sales volume of each tenant . The 
i nve stor's income and mortgage security will be a f fected by 
t hs l evel of store sale s up to thi s maximum ruuount . 
The p ercentag e asked vari e s con side l~ly with t e 
location and t he nature of the retailer's business . The 
compa r ati'.re po s ition of t he depart ilent store can be s een 
Table XXVIII 
~nnual Percentage Lease-P ercentage of Gro ss Income Paid f or Rent 
(Average f i gures f or each section of t h e country) 
Santa Barbara 
California 
Departmen t Stores 
Groc e r y Stores 
(chain s) 
2- 3% 
Knoxville 
Tenn. 
4-5% 
Washing t on 
D.C. 
? 4 ([/ 
./- jo 
Chicago N. Y. 
Ill. 
3-4;b 3- 4% 
2-3 2- 3 
8-10 Women's FuYni shings 
J·evvelry 
2- 3 
6- 8 
6- 8 
4-7 
3 
10 
10 
2-3 
7- 8 
6-8 
6 - 7 
8-10 10-12 
Furniture 5- 6 
Source : Geoff rey Baker and Bruno Funaro, nsh opping Center, 
Design and Operation", Reinhold Publishing Company, 
New York City, 1951, p . 20 . 
The percentage required bears a direct rel tionsh i p to t he 
prof it or me.r k- up of t he retailer . Stores op erating on a 
6- 8 
~ov1 mB.rgin or profit , such as t h e supermarkets and department 
store s, pay t h e lo~est percentages . Store s operati ng on a 
h igh marg in, j ewel ry store s for example , pay the h i ghest 
p e rc entages . 
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2 . Guaranteed Leases 
Percentage leases usually call f or a minimum 
gua.ranteed rental at all times , i n addition to a percentage 
of th8 gross vol u.rne over a stipulated amount . Strong chain 
stores witu proven records can sometimes ma__"k:e leases with no 
minimums, but th is type of l ease i s fast disappearing . For a 
maj or sh opping center :it is i mp ortant f or t he real t or to 
get a big store t enant to attract shoppers to the area . 
Often sp Gcial concessions are made to secu re department 
stor e tenant s involving lo·v, er grade rentals ar1d o ther consid-
7~ 
e rations su ch a s a maximum rental fee . 
3 . Cost s 
Al though agreements and condi tions vary 2~d every 
l ease is a separate business deal , some conclusions can be 
made f rom the f i gures available . 
In reg ional centers both th e guaranteed minimum 
and the p er centage tend t o be h i gher thrul. department stores 
pay in o t h er suburban areas. A recent study of these regional 
cen ters s·10VI S thc.t department stores with at l east 180, 000 
square f eet of gross area pay minimum rents rang ing from 90 
Jl \I ,,,~ 
cent s t o $1.10 per square f oo t of gro s s area. The 
p ercentage runs fr om 2% to 3% of sal es wi th break points as 
vo l um e ri-ses . Thes e stores s?10uld do f rom $6 0 to 80 dollars 
-:~43 ' p . 1 
-:H<- 36 , p . 177 
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per square f oot i n gro s s sal2s armually . The per centage 
is : i gh er f or other lines, running as h i gh a s 10% for a 
small milli n c:r y shop. Minimum guaranteed rentals averag e 
$1. 50 p er square foot for r egional centers a s a whole . 
Tne r efore , o the r tenents mu s t pay h i gher ren tals than the 
department stor e s. Leases usually run f or t wenty years ·with 
t wo t en year options , and long term percentag e leases are 
a l most universal f or department stores • 
.Ji.mior department stor es guaran t eed mi n i mum rental 
i n regional c enters ra.:c'lge f rom $1. 00 to $l.AO p er square 
f oo t . Percentage runs from 2- 3% of sale s per square f oot 
and sale s run $70-80 per square f oot annually. 
In t he citie s t he depal~tment store has a natural 
adv~~tag e ov er i t s small specialty shop comp e titor since 
it uses extensively these cheaper upp er f loors or s el l i ng 
spa ce . Acc ording to a British study done a few years ag o, 
r eal estate cost of 6epartment stor es run on the average of 
4% of' sale s, whil e in spe cialty shops in the same central 
\1 " 
localtions , rentals r un be t ween 6 and 10% of sal es. 
i'j(" 
Althougn i t would normally be exp e c ted that real e state co st s 
of a dovm t ovvn a r ea would be far h i ghe r t h an f or suburban. areas, 
t h e u se of the l e ss de sirable upper f loor f or selling space 
r educes t his di f f erence. In a study by Malcolm .M cNair these 
comparative costs are seen . 
-)l- 34 , PP . 106-21 
-)*"*10 ' p. 136 
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Table XXIX 
Department Sto re Real Es tate Costs As A Percentage of Sale s 
1956 
(To tal n s t sale s $10 million ruld up) 
No branche s in 1956 
Less than 20% branch store sal es 
20% or more branch sales 
Real Estate Cost s per Square Foo t 
~ o bran ches in 1956 
Less t h an 20% branch store sal e s 
20~& or more branch sales 
3 .05 
2 . 80 
3 .00 
$1.40 
1.10 
l. /..:.5 
Source : •1 alco l m McNair , '10perating Resul t s of Department and 
Specialty Stores i n l956n, Bureau of Business Research , 
1957 , p . 48 
To day r eal estate or occupancy co s t s of dep a r tment 
sto r e~, according to thi s same study , range f rom 4 - 5% to 
2 . 09% of n e t sal e s dep endi ng on the size of the store. 
In general t he larger t 1:1 e n e t sale s , the small er t o.e 
pe rcen tage of total real estate co s ts . Included i n this 
total real estate figure a re property rentals , t axes , i mputed 
interest, i n surance and depreciation . Th ere are othe r 
op erating expense s n ot included i n the se charg es that are 
really r ental charges passed on to t he tenant . I n view 
of this mo s t tenants i n shopping center s t ake care of their 
ovm cleaning , ligh t i ng and de cora ting . Some furnish t h eir 
ovm heat ruld o t hers do not. 
B. Cos t of Erec t i ng Own Struc ture 
In an effor t to t ake greates t advantag e of the 
prof its of shoppi ng cen t ers, many of t he l arg er depar tment 
stores developed their ovm marketing centers . Since t h e 
* 32 , pp . 100-105 
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costs involved are so substantial , this op eration is usually 
limited t o the l arger stores . 
The co s ts of building a shopping cen t e r varies 
with t h e co st of the l and , t he type of construc tion, t he arnount 
of parking space, and the extras t he developer may or may 
n ot install . According to a study made by Robert Armstrong 
of Armstrong Assoc iate s in 1955 , building costs for the 
smaller stores run from $11 to $1 3 per square foot and $14 to 
$18 f or the depa rtmen t store . In addition to the co s ts of 
t he structure the larg e r store will spend from $5 to $7 per 
s qu are foot on f i xtures . Other co st s include s t ock, which 
·w-a s estimated at $10 per square f oot or mor e, receivable s a t 
$10 p er s quare foot , and appropriation of funds for pay-
men ts of salarie s and wages. The total co sts of opening a 
singl e department store will 8lllount to $39 or $45 pe r s quare 
f oot. For exa:nple, the dollar out lay required to open a dep-
artment store with approximately 180, 000 sq. feet wou l d r un 
be t ween $7 and $8 million . 
Table :.K.XX 
Cos ts of Building a Sh opping Center 
Buil ding Co sts ~~11~-18 p er square fo ot 
Fi x t u res 5- 7 II II II 
Stoclc 10 tt II II 
Receivabl es 10 II II II 
Total 39-45 
180,000 sq . ft . X $39- $'7 , 020 , 000 minimum 
1 0 , 000 sq . ft • .X $45-$8 ,100 , 000 maximum 
Sour ce : Robert H. Arms trong , " A New Look at Shopping Center sn , 
Appraisal J ournal, Jan . 19 55 , pp . 100-105 
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Toda y v er y few dep ar t men t s tol~e s a r e bu i l ding branche s of 
l ess than 1 00 , 0 00 s q . f t ., and i n t he Nevi Yor k area the 
t endency i s to build stor e s of at l ·.::ast 200 , 0 0 0 sq . ft . Sin ce 
t h e sh opp i ng center is usually dev eloped a s a uni t , con structi on 
cost s alon e have be en esti mated at $10-12 per sq . f t . f or 
t i:1ese centers but co sts of $25 upwar -~ a re n ot unusual . ~'" 
To t c.< is mus t be added i nteres t costs on bor rm-Jed mon ey , main -
t enance , management and pr omot ional co s ts . An unu suall y 
strong fir mi gtl t co n cei vabl y be abl e t o finance thi s 
proj ect wi t h ou t bo r r owing . I n most i nstance s , outs i de financ-
i ng i s r equired . 
c. Types of Outsi de Fi n ancing : 
1 . Loans 
A Store can finance its branc 1. s t or e t h r ough long , 
sh or t or combinat ion bank loans. Generally, if t he company 
ha s s ubs tantial a s sets, particularly in the form of real 
estate, a f i r st mort ga ge on real estate is preferred to 
mortga ge deb en ture f i nancing . Mortgage deb en t ures usually 
i mpose re strictive covenants t hat can be costly in limiting 
t h e companies finan cial operat ions. The se provisions 
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may limit the i s suance of addit i onal debt, restrict 
dividend payments and require the maintenance of a 
certain work ing capital position. 
Anothe r alternative is a direct institutional 
inve stment loan. Through this method a loan is placed 
privately >-r i th an inst :t tutional investor, and the costs 
of floating a public issue are eliminated. It is unlikely 
that t hhs long term loan can be procured for more than 66 2/3% 
"''-
of t he appraisal value of the p r oject." "Interest rates 
and amortization would be about the same l evel as t h ose 
obtaine d in pr j_me commercial property."~~ The averag e size 
of the se loans put t h em b eyond the reach of many mortg age 
l enders. A f e1.-r have be e n financed b y mutual saving s banks 
and commercial banks. In addition , some private real estate 
syndicat e s have ent e r e d into this field. These organizations 
do not hav e l egal limi t at i ons on their lending s as do 
insurance companies, anQ therefore can ent er special a greements 
which combine mortgage financing with purchase of stock. 
The extent to '!Thich long t erm debt is used to finance 
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department sto res ac t ivities is difficult t o de ter ine becaus e 
n o aggregate balru1ce shee t f i gu re s ar e published f or 
depc:. rtment stores a s a separate gr oup . The Federal Trade 
Commission and t he Securiti e s and Exchange Commission publ i shed 
a,~ g regate sta tistics fol~ t h e r etail trade unti l 1952 and 
breakdo~<'ln s of this cla s s i f ication t~1roug·,:1 1951 . Using the se 
ravv- f i gur·es vre h ave computed t r1e re sults a s a percentage 
of t otal assets . 
Tabl e x:.xxr 
Long Term Debt-Manufacturing , H.etailing , and Retailing-
Gen eral Merc landising- 1950- 52 
(As a Percent of Total Assets) 
l.2.2Q ~ .1.2..52 
All lVi a11ufacturing : 
Ban1c Loans 
Oth er 
To t al 
All Retailing : 
Banlc Loans 
OthGr 
Total 
Retailing- General 
Bank Loans 
Oth er 
To t al 
1 . 6 
'7 . 2 
8 . 8 
1 . 3 
..hQ 
6 . 3 
Merchandising : 
1 . 7 
~ 
6 . 6 
1.6 
6 . 8 
8 . 4 
1 . 8 
lc , 8 
6 . 6 
2 . 7 
u 
7 . 5 
2 .0 
7 . 6 
9.6 
Sou r ce : Computed from data presented in Federal Trade 
Comm i ssion a11d Secu rities & Exchange Commi ssion , 
11 Qua r· t erly Financial Repor t Series" , 1950 , 1951 , 1952 
All manufacturing conersn appear to u se de bt financi ng to 
a signi f ican tly l ar ger ext ent t han retail trade s , as sh ovm i n 
t L1e t l-lree y ears under consideration . Retai l f irms are 
generally h igh risk trade i nvestmen t s . Th e f ailure rate is 
higher t han for ot h er lin e s of bu siness . ·_igh r i sk industr i e s 
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usuall- avoid f inancing throug1 debt , a s in bo.d t i me s r equ i r ed 
f i x e d charg e s cou l d threaten the company's solvency . ea vy 
relianc e on debt f unds i s typ ica l l y f ound i n sta.ble , l o • 
rise i l.Qustri e s , su e_ a s the utilit group . The general me r -
chandi s i ng grou p in which depar t ment store s are i n clu ded u se 
debt finru1 cing t o a l arge r extent than doe s tne agg r egate 
re t ailing gr oup . 
Ba.YLk lom.-~ s per se con s t i t u t e a l arger po r tion of 
t h e f i nancing of gen er a l merchandi se s to re s t h an they do i n 
t he case of all r e t ailing and all manufa cturing . Since a 
ma j ority of t i1e epart ment s t ore s are t oo sn all to fl oat public 
i ssues i t i s n ecessary f or t hem t o go t o t he bank f or funds . 
2 . Pu blic Bond Issues : 
Funds are sometirne s rai sed t hr ough a debenture 
i ~ .. sue , bu t thi s i s u su ally limi ted to t h e l a r ge r s tores. 
Often , i f a compan is able t o be con sidered f or suci1 an issue, 
t "1e i nterest r a t e s a r e lower tha.YJ. fil~s t mor t gage fir.:. anc ing , 
a~1d i t may be a dvan tageous to u se t his me t hod . Under t he 
mor t gage deben t u re th e re i s l es s ri sk invol ved f or t h e l ender . 
Be ma y r equire the bor rower t o k eep certain reser ve s avail-
abl e at a.ll t i me s , to maintain a ctefi n i te amount of vmr_~..ing 
ca)~ i tal, t o limit a d . i t i on a l debt o r pa nnent of di v i d.ends , or 
to maKe no furthe r f i nancial commitments wi t out h is 
sp ecif ic a 9proval . Alt oug ·l thi s may restrict ma.n agement , the 
lov.'er co s t s involved may justi fy thi s f or m of f inan cing . 
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The creation of t ·1ese senior secu ri t i e s , may 
e f fect t !1e common sto ckl olders t hrough po s itive or n egati ve 
l e verage . In addit ion , i t wi ll malce it more di f f icult f or 
the company to f inance i f addi tional f unds are required at 
a l ate r da te . Subordin a te det entures will be costly , as the 
i n vestor Jill 1:vi s to be paid for taking a grea t e r ri sk, an d 
the increased risk factor may adversely effe ct fu ttue 
s t o cl\: i ssuance . 
All manufacturing conce r n s u s e long t erm f i nanc i ng 
other than t h rough baP~ l oans to a larger ex tent t h an the 
r e tailing groups . Dur~ng t h e p eriod 1945- 1949 on l y f ive bond s 
were publicaly i s sued in t he merchandising fie l d . In t h e 
period 1950 through the second quarter 1952 , department s t ore s 
and women's app a re l store s issued only two publi cly li sted 
Tu.l>J_ e XXXII 
Cost of Flotation of Bond s-1945-52 
Ave . Size of Co st of No of 
Flot ation s Flotation Fl otation 
1945-49# 
Merch andising 
Industry 
Jl . .!.l Industr 
1950- 52 ( s econd 
All Retailing 
Dep t . Store 
Womens Apparel 
(mill . $) % of gross proceeds 
5 8 . 2 
360 " ~,_25 . 3 
quarter ) ''" 
3 5. 1 
2 3 . 6 
2 . 58 
1 . 30 
2 . 9 
3 . 0 
Source : #U . S . Securiti e s & Exchange Conu"'l i ssion, "Survey of 
American Li sted Corporati ons , Co s t of Flota t i on , 1945-4911 
Wash i ng ton , D. C., 1949 , p . 35 
~--><-Compil ed fr om raw data presented i n U. S. Se curi t i e s 
& Exchang e Commi ssion , 11 Co st of Fl ot ation", WasLi ng ton, 
D. C. , 1950-1952 , s econd quarter 
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We conclude t h<:).t department store s and retailin g use l e ss 
long t e rm debt f i nanc i ng thm~ manufcctur i ng corporations . 
This avoi dance o f long term debt may be due t o a number o f 
fac tors , of which t he mo st i mportant is that fixed charge s 
on bond interest mu s t b e pai d regardl ess o f earning s . 
Depa rtment store s operate on a small p ro f it margin and i n 
p oo r year s t he se inte rest charg e s might finan cially weal{:en the 
company . 
The co s t o i' f lotation o f me rchm1dis i n g bond i ssu e s 
v.e. s substantially h i gher than t he co st of f lotation o f' a ll 
manufacturing i ndustr i e s, t !.1ough the s tatisti_cal signi f icance 
o f t he se f i gur s i s ques t ionabl e . I n 1 945-1949 , the c o st 
o f fl o tati on of publ icaly li s ted bonds , measured in p e rcentage 
o f g r o ss proceeds , was 2 . 98% f o r me rc~J.a~c: dising groups and 1. 30% 
for all industries . This difference i s attributable to t h e 
small er s i ze o f t he mc: rcheJldising i ssue s . Since there we re 
so fev1 b onds i ssu ed in the 1950- 52 p e r i o d a simi l a r compar-
i son is impo ss ible . Cu rrent co st s o f f lotation are not publi~ ed 
f or ~he merchandi sing o r r e tail trade , s o u p t o date c o st s 
c anno t be measured . 
3 . Sale ru~d Le aseback 
Th e sale and lease baclc i s n o t a current innovati on. 
There a r e records t o sh ow tha t suc t1 a tra:..l'lsaction took p l ace 
~-
in Eng land as far back as 1882 . Yet it was n o t until t h e 
lat- 1 940's t hat t £1e s a l e ru1d l easeback became p opular i n 
t £1is cou;:. try . This re cent adoption has b r2en due to a nm.:1 ber 
-l(- 33 , p . 296 
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of f actors : the large demand o:t insurance compenie s f or sat-
isfactory invesw1 ents of t heir fund s; the rel axation of off icial 
attitudes to p er mi t this investment in t h e r eal e sta te 
field; and t e current n eeds of busine ss f or rais i ng working 
capi tal . 
Before 1942 i n surance companie s ·were of'ficially 
allovred to inves t funds i n real e state only f or t heir oVJTl 
u se :~ wi t r1 the exception of properties ac quired t b.rough f ore-
clo sure s or t i:1 rough s i milar circum stances . Thes e prop e rti e s 
mus t be disposed of wi thin f i ve years:~ or Viith in an 
a ddi tional time perioci gra11ted by t he In surance Commi s s ion . 
In 191~2 , Virg i n:B. v.;as th e f i r st state to change its off i cial 
" -,\ 
a ttitude . It s l e gislature gave insuran ce compani e s t h e 
r i ght to i nves t u p to 5% of their asset s i n real esta t e . In 
1e l a t e r f orti e s other sta tes began to follow t heir l e2.d , by 
taking affirma. t i ve action an d author izi ng this t;y pe of 
i nves t ment or by failing t o make r e strictions to the contra r y.# 
As World "'War II came to a clo e , lif e i~"l surance compa _i e s , 
un iversitie s , and oth e r i ns ti tutions were looking f o r safe :~ 
sound i nve stments tha t would give t hem a r easonable r t u rn . 
Real estate seemed to offe r such an opportuni t y and the relax-
ation of r eal estate restriction s :P '2r mi t.t ed t he se i nstitutions 
t o en t r into sal e ru1d l eas eback arrangements . 
At t i:le Sa.Iile time t h e depar t ment sto re s began to 
s ee.lc t he vast suburba:..1 ma rke t s, :n d branch stor e movement began 
t o be in e arn ,'C; st . This expansion into new outle ts increased t he 
""33 p . 296 ' .. 
# 7 s ta t e s i n 1945 , 3 states in l 9.Lr6 , 21 i n 1947, and 4 i n 1948 
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--.-o l;:in0 cap i tal needs o t ti:le -epart 1 ent stores and t ·_ey , too , 
became inc reasingl y intereste d i n the sale and l easeba ck as 
a 'inancing arrm~gement . 
A sale an l easeback arraJlgement i s an agr :-::!ement 
-,he r e bv a departwent sto re or o t cw r bus i ness sells property 
it own s to an i nsti tution o r private i nvestor and tlle leases 
i t back f or a p .:: riod o f t r1 enty to thirty year s . any depart-
ment store s in recent years entered i nto t he se transactions 
includ ng su c u stores a s Gil cln,i s t , Gi mbels , AbrahaJ, and 
Straus , Alli e d Sto res , Hearns , and Lord and Taylor . Wnat 
ar e the re2.sons thc-~ t supp o r t this type o f ninc:mcir~g and 
·f 1a t are the advru~ tage s o f such an arrang ement? 
Advantage s: 
By selling the iJ rop e rty to an i nsurance company o r 
o t -ilGr investor, complli"lY c ap i tal i s freed to meet ;,rorking ca ~ : i tal 
needs that o the rv . ti .se would be t i e d up in r eal estate . Let 
us see h ow t is work s i n a typ ical case . 
X Comp any Balan ce Sheet 
Assets : 
Cas:J. 
Accow1t s Re ceivable 
nventory 
To tal Current Assets 
Lan d and Building 
Oth e r Assets 
To ·cal Asse ts 
Liabili t i e s and Ne t Worth 
o tes Payable 
Accounts Payable 
Ot1e r Cu rr ent Li abilities 
To tal Current Liabilities 
Capital Stock 
Surolus 
To tal Liabiliti e s & Net Worth 
Bef ore Sal e 
and Le aseback 
500 
1000 
2500 
4000 
2000 
2000 
8000 
1500 
1500 
_2.QQ 
3500 
2000 
2500 : 
8000 
Pro For ,a 
2000 
1000 
25 00 
5500 
2000 
7500 
1 500 
500 
2000 
2000 
2. 500 
7 500 
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Before the s al e and l ·:c: aseback t he current rati o i s 1 . 1~ and 
t h e net v:orki ng cap i tal is $ 500 . I f t he dep a rtment s t o re 
so l d t ·ne building and l and f o r cash, th e current ratio -vvou l ci. 
be 2- . 7 5 and t h e n 2 t wo r k ing cap i t al $35 00 . T 1u s t h •.:: sa.l e 
i mp r oves t h e liquiciity and cash pos i t ion o f the f i rm . 
Capi tal i s f r s e to i nvest i n i nventory o r expand facilities 
t o ~eate mo re s ales . 
Inc reased worki ng cap i tal i s n o an a dvar tage 
uni que to a s a l e and l Gaseback f inancing arrang emen t . A 
company may borro·w fund s on a lon g te r m b a s i s by mortgaging 
its property . I n thi s manner additional money is made avail-
abl e f o r wo r k i ng capita l needs . It i s dou btful , h ohever , 
t ha t a l ende r wi l l grant a loan e qual to t h e full val ue o f 
t h e prop erty . 
Thr ough t he sale and l easeback t i1e firm will rece i ve 
t h e f ull value o f i ts real e stat e . If t h i s prop e rty is s ol d a t 
a pro f it the depar t ment sto re must pay tax on this gain . Thi s 
tax reduc es t !.1. e t o t a l am ount o f f unds a vailabl e through t h e 
aal e and l e a s eback arrffi1g ement . 
T _e depart~nent store i n a S{Ueeze p osition for Ym rki ng 
cap i tal mu st obtain fm'lds from s ome means i f i t is t o c on t i nue 
op e ration s . Through th e sal e ru1d l easeback c redit is l e ss 
t i e d up than i t i s in ou tr i ght borrovdng o f funds t o meet t:~ese 
l' e c:1.uirernents . Th e l e ssee may vJi s i.1 t o avoid funded debt 1• 1i th 
i t s f i x ed ma turity provisions and restri c tive c on v enants 
a ga i ns t borrowi ng . The l ease back method o i' f i nancing raises 
t h e working capital y t allows mo re f l ex i bility with 
respect t o f inc: .. n cial managem ent . 
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The s ale and l easeback enable s management to 
concentra.te its effort and cap ital on the r e tailing business , 
i t s principle concern . Wha tever t h e line o f work , manageE1ent t s 
main f unc tion is to mru{e money . Th e basic question is whether 
t he u se o f the cash secured f rom the sale will give a better 
return to t he compan y , ov e r and above the rental co s ts , t h an 
it would i f invested i n real es tate . The profitability o f 
each c ase mu s t be considered i n itsel f . Il' t he company 
can earn a better ,· eturll. on its own operations t han it could 
-;:i t J:-.i i t s funds in real estate , then t he leaseback •Fould be 
v·o r t h considering . 
It is maintained t hat rentals charged under the sale 
and l easeback deals are l e ss t h an they would be o the r v;ise. 
In t h e long r u.n this claim could not be true . If rental 
pa- ment s u..nder t he sale and leas eback remained l ess than under 
str aigh t rental contract , e v e ry company muld s eek out such 
an a g reement . When the demand e x ceeded t he suppl y , i n surance 
companies would inc rease their lease r ates . 
A tax advantage is inhe rent in t h e sale a:.."'1d l ease-
back a.rrangemen t as compared to mo r tgage form o f f inancing . 
Rental payments are entirely deduc tible f o r t a x purposes bu t 
fund s used to amortize mortgag es are taxable 1L'1.der the present 
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l aw . Le t u s take an exampl e and s ee how t his works out . 
In our illus tration t he department store ovm s l and and bu ilding 
v;orth $ 5 million but needs fw:1d s · 'or working capital and is o Jli-
ged to sell or mor t gage t h i s prop e r t y . 
X Comp an y-Taxes Under Sale and Leaseback Vs . Iv1 ortgage 
Financing 
I ncome f rom operations 
Le s s Depre ciation 
Less Inte rest 
Less Rent 
Taxable Income 
Tax-5 2% 
Income After Tax 
$1, 000, 000 
75 ,000 
925,000 
80,00Q 
845 , 000 
none 
845 , 000 
439.400 
405 , 600 
1, 000 , 000 
none 
none 
180 , 000 
820 , 000 
426 ,400 
393 , 600 
An i nvestor of f ered to l end t h e department s t ore $ 3 million 
on t tJ.e bui l ding in a mortgage type a rrangement or to buy 
t h e building f or t ne s ame amount . Under t h e t erm s of t he 
mor tgage , $180 , 000 wou l d be repaid each year , $80, 000 
inter e st and $100,000 amortization of the loan f or a p e r i od. 
of t h i rty ye ars . By utili zing t h e sale an d leaseba ck , t n e 
r ental wou l d be the same :\lil 80 , 000 annually . The epa r t-
ment store cou l d gain , as far as tax i s ccncerned , by sale and 
l easeback •ahe r e t he $180 , 000 i s entirely deductible. Under 
t h e mortgage plan , t he $100,000 to runor ti ze the loan would 
n ote be deductible . 
Anoth -::: r a rgument t hat centers about tax consider-
at ions has been pre sented i n suppor t of financing t hrough the 
pu r ch2.se lease . Since t he l e a se life is shorter t h an t h e 
depreciable life of t r1e bu i l cl..ing , it can be wri t t en off mor e 
r apidly t han i f it were ovmed . Th is conten t i on is basically 
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unsouna a s deprecia tion is an advru1.tage t o t h e l e ssor t ha t 
is lost by the l e ssee in a sal e ru1.d leaseback arrangment . 
The rental payment s 2.re an actual expense , while deprecia tion 
i s a return of f rmds to t he company and n ot an out -of -pocke t 
exp 2ndi ture . It coul d hardly be reasonctble to increase ex-
pense s of doing bu siness merely to decrease taxes , i f thi s 
would result i n l e ss prof it to t h e firm. 
Disadvantages : 
Under t he ter ms of t h e sale an d l easeback t h e 
department store is tied to a. l ong term r ental ag r eement 
s tre tch i ng t ·wenty or thirty yea.r s . Th e s t ore cannot move to 
a sup erior locati on a s is po ssi ble under o t he r type s of 
f i n ancing . It must adhere to t he t er ms o f t h e contract . 
I n t h e retail fiel d t his f r eedom of movement is a mo st 
i mp or tant f a ctor . The shift ing oi' r e t ail areas withi n a 
g iven city i s an age-old peh enomenon . Neu York 's best 
r e tail districts a mndred years ago cent ered around Grand 
Street and t he Bower y . In the 1900's t he sh opp i ng cen t er 
shifted t o 14t h and 23 streets and l ater to 34th Stree t . 
Th e ou t stan ding department stor es did not begin to move 
up Fift h Avenue unt i l t i:1e l ate 20's . A department stor e with 
a long term l ea se may suffer gr eatly Vii t h a chang e i n 
neighborhood s . Car1cellation of t ne l ease i s the only r emedy , 
but the co s t of this is usual l y ver y hig·c~ . 
On the other hand , i f the loca tion i mproves over 
t t1 e years, the l andlord benef'i ts fr om the increased value of 
t ·lle r eal estate . The seller can benefit a s r ell since t here 
1 
is usual l y a renewal clause that allows the l ease to be 
col1.t i nu ed af ter i t s expiration at a f r action of the 
or i g i nal cos t . 
Since r ent ch arges are arranged so t 1at the i n ve sto r 
vd ll ge t back h is i n vestmen t within the f i xed period of 
the lease , rental co s t s usually run above compara bl e co st s 
uncie r mortgag e financing . In adverse perio ds these h i gher 
cos t s may be ruinous . Ther e i s a cont ingen t liability to 
me e t t he se r en tal pa;n:nen ts , even thoug!.l. n ot s p·::.: cif ically 
stated i n the balance shee t . 
Inhe r en t in the purchas e l ease deal is anothe r 
dang er . Once the maj or "firop erti e s a r e s ol d , t he cash 
r e ce ived i s put t o work i n cur rent ope rations to expand s a l es . 
There remains no ba ckbon e of financia l strength i n t 1e 
comp any after i ts maj or f i xed a sset has been liquidated . 
Stripping the f irm of its tangible as se t s may pr ove to be 
poor fina:.r1 cial planning i n terms of a long t e r m financ ial 
ou tlook . 
Total r eal e s tate i nvestment s of United States 
life i nsurance compan i es w·e r e a bout 2! billion dollars i n 
1955 or three time s greater t h c:m a de cade ag o, accordin g t o 
f i gure s comp ile s by t h e Institute of Li fe I n su ranc e . 
Commercial an d industr i al proper t i e s r ep r esen t 60% of lif e 
i nsu_ran ce holdings i n real e sta t e . A substantial number 
-~17 ' pp . 78- 79 
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of th ese pr operti e s were a.cq_uired by life i n surance CO!tipani e s 
on a l easeback ba sis . Vv e shal l exaltli ne the fa c t or s t"t1a t 
attrac t life insu rance compani e s to t he se purch ase l ease 
arrangement s and the disadvantages of such an agreement if 
any . 
Pe r hap s t he chief attrac t ion of t he sale and 
l eas eback f rom the point of vi ew of t he l essor i s that h e 
wi ll usually r e ce ive a h i gher U1an averag e rate of return 
on h is inve stment . Here i s a long t er m inve stmen t p o ~ sibil-
ity for i nsti tu tions that of f e rs a h i ghe r ra t e of return t h an 
is possibl e from t he t radi tion al mor tgage or bon ds. Depreciat ion 
a llowa n ce f or tax purpose s may mal~:e this return partially 
tax fr e e . 
There is also t h e added p rof it po tential a1d 
i nfl a tion heeige to be gained f rom this i nvestment . Th e l essor-
owne r i n general, set s t e r ms so tha t he 'iiiil l h ave h i s money 
back at t he en d o f the f i xed contra c t part of t he l ease . 
At tf~e te r mi n a tion of this or i ginal l ease the property 
will still have val u e . The ovnkr wi ll h ave the op t ior to 
continue to l eas e t he property or t o s el l it f or a possible 
lon g ter m capital gain. Many i n the i n suranc e fie l d f e el 
that t l.1 i s is an illusory advantage sinc e repurc. a. se options 
h ave be come stand ard prac t ice . -:<- Unl ess t be r·epurc ase op ti on 
is set a t the fa ir mark ,.:; t value a t the · i me of trJ.e repurchase , 
i t ill n eg ate the possible i nfl a. t i on hedg e advan tage . 
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Vfh er e the l ease contains an option to repurc :tase 
the .Jues tion arises as to wnether the transaction is i n fact 
a l ease f or tax purpo se s o r ·v•:llethe r it is an arrangeme ... t 
f or t i:1 e purch ase o f prop erty . If the treasury considers 
t h e t ra.n sac tion a purchase agreement , the annual payment s 
are n o t tax d educ t ible as rent . A purchase tran s ac tion if 
i ndicate d where the proper t y may be acquired f o r a price which 
is nomi n a l in relation to ~ e value o f t h e prop e rty at the 
t ime t he option is exercised. ~~ Tu e Inte rnal Revenue Service 
r e asons that if t~e op t ion p r i ce is v e ry low, it i s almo st 
c e r t ain to b e exercised . The departmen t sto re will h ave 
t he s am e in tere sts before and after t h e sal e . T 1erefor e , 
if a company enter s i nto a sale and_ l easeback agr e em ent ._ , t.. .. e 
pri ~~ e o f the repurch ase option s must not be nomi nal . 
On the other h and t h e purch ase l andlord , in o rde r 
t o d e rive a greater return t h a.n t hrough mo r tgage financing , 
is ta~ing a g r eater risk by i nvesting directl y in r eal e s tate. 
The value o f h i s i nvestment d epends on the l es s ee's ability 
to mee t ren ta 1. payments under t he l e ase . In t he case o f t he 
tenant 's i nsolvency the l andlord i s l i mited i n h is rights , 
as he is n o t a pro tecte d c reditor . 
The sale and leaseback is p a rticularly attractiv e 
to l a r e i nstitutions since t he arra:.rtg ement usually invol v e s 
a substantial i nves t raent for a c on s i d erable l eng t h o f t ime . 
* 55 , p p . 11 , 297-11 , 299 , paragraphs 11, 838 , 11 , 840 
The l andlor Ci , like the tenc.n t , is boun 6. t o t'1e t<=.:rms o f the 
long term contract and carmot sell out from under the tenant . 
The l andlord 's tax position can change as is the 
cas e o f charities . Pr eviously they w2 r e tax exempt i n the 
case of t~e sal e and l ea seback. Now t h ey are taxed if t he 
term o f the l ease i s for more than five years and t h e y use 
a subs t antial amount of borrowed cap i t al to ma.l;:e the purchase . 
In t h is situation the option to reneV'I t he l ease is cou t ed 
in det<:;;rmi n i ng the l ength o f t he lease . 
In summary , one cam1ot set f orth any clea r cut 
rul e s on V·:hen the sale a n d lease back v~ould be a profitable 
arrangemen t f or the departi.ent store . All me tho d s o f inancing 
must be explored and th e resulting co:3ts compared . On t h e 
basis o f these computations in a ddition to th e a f orementioned 
considerations, each situation can be judged by i tself. 
4 . Stocl\: Financing 
De pa rtr::t en t store s can finance t heir long term capital 
n;seo.s throug (J. s tock i s suance . As was t rue with bon d s a 
putlic offering o f this type is li111Ji ted to t 'ne larg e r stores . 
The quest ion th a t arises immedi a tely i s 1mv i mport-
ant i s c ommon stock f ina.ncine; to department stores? I n attempt-
ing t o answe r tnis qu es tion we can look at an aggregate 
balance sheE~ t t o show typ i cal capitalization of a department 
store . Data compil e d by t he U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
i n U1e 11 Statistics o f Incomett reduced to p e rcentage figures 
f or t h e years 1951- 54, r eveals t ha t the retailing - general 
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me rch andisi ng cla s sif ication , t he group that includes 
d e p artment s tore s, is more h e avily f inanced t h rougi:-1 equity than 
t ·~ roug b. debt . 
Table XXXIII 
Capital Stock , Su rp l us , and Long Term De b t As a P e r centa g e 
o f Total Asset s Re tailing- General Merc·clandi s ing-1951-1954 
1951 
.l2.52 .l2.5_1 .l.9_5_4 
Bonds , n o -ce s mor tgage p ayable 
one year or mo r e 7 . 5 7 . 4 8 . 2 7 . 6 
ap i tal Stock-Pre f erred 4 - 9 4 - 7 4 . 1 4 . 3 
Capi t al Stock-Common 1 8 . 3 17 . 7 1 8 . 4 17 . 6 
Surp lus Res e rves 4 - 4 3 . 9 3 . 0 2 . 7 
Surplu s & Undivided Profits 4 2 . 7 43 . 8 44. 2. 4 5 . 6 
Source : Computed from raw data presented in U. S . Inte rnal 
Revenu e Se r·vice , 11 Sta tistics o f Income" , Wash i ngton , 
D.C., 1951 , 1 9 52 , 1953 , 1954 
Corumon s t ock r un s a b out 1 7-18% of total assets as comp e,r ed 
to about 7-8% f or lon g t e r u debt . This con t rast ' ould 
be e ve::l g r e a ter i f capital surpl us were included in th e 
c ommon stock figur e. As i t is, t h i s capital surplus a ccoun t 
is l i nk ed to e a rned sur p lus , so t 1at c a :l] ital i zation o f c ommon 
sto cK is at s t<?,ted value , which may be l e:ss t h an the total 
sum rai sed through common stock i s su ance . 
The Fede r a l Trad e Com.rn i ssion an ci the Se c\;_ri t i e s and 
Exch ang e Commission have compile d a gg reg ate balar" ce sr e ets 
o r t h e retailing- general rn c:; rc~-_ano_i~3 ing c a tag ory f or t ile 
•ear s 1 9 51 and 1 9 52 . Th e sta tistics presented i n terms o f 
p e rc en tag e of total asset s sho'N capital stock , cap i tal surpl us 
a -ced mi n o r ity i nterest a t 27~% . 
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Tabl e :X ..XXIV 
Common Stock , Capital Surplus, lil inori t Interest- lvlanufa ctu ring , 
Retailing , Retailing General ~erchaLdising , 1950- 1952 
All manufacturing 
All Retailing 
1952 
27 . 2 
25 . 2 
Retailing- g ene ral merchandising 
_lli..Q 
30 . 9 
26 -4 
27 . 5 Ho t Available 
Source : Compi led fr om stati ~ tics p resente d i n U. S . Federal 
Trade Commi ss ion anQ Securities & Exchange Co~~ission , 
" Qu arte rly Fine..ncial Report Seri e s" 1950 , 1951 , 1952 
Wh en comp e::ring the ag g regate bal ance shee ts we d o 
n ot find a sign i f icaiJ. t l y l arge difference ·etween t i1 e p ro-
portion o f common stock fu11ds raiseci to finan ce all manufa ct-
uring compani e s , all r e tailin g , and retailing- general merch a _d-
ising . A sligh tly l a rger proportion o f all manufacturing 
compani e s funds i s r ai sed t hrough common s tocl'\: than f o r 
r ~) tailing and i ts s ubclassification . We conclude t ·nat 
finan cing through common s tock i s roughl y as i mportan t f or 
u epartment stores as for all manufactur i ng i ndustries . 
Since corrLmon stock i s suc (l an i mp ortant p ,;_r t o f 
t 1e financing of a de-partment store , -vve n a turall y want to 
know at co sts are invol ved . 
In t he p c~ri od 19~-5 -49 , the me rc·na.ndi sing i ndustry 
r eg i s t e r e d 24 nevv i ssues vvi th the Securi ti e s and Ex.chang e 
Commission . The ave rag e size of t he i ssu e v1as $2 million 
Em_d t he co sts of f lo tation 9 . 37% o f t h e gro ss pro ceeds . 
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8 . 0 2~S went to t h e investment ban.k s rs as commissi on and d i s-
coun t , and 1 . 35% for o t h e r exp en s e s . Th is co s t o f flo t a tion 
for common stock was much h i gh•::o r than for bond s or preferred 
sto ck , V{1ich ran 2 . 58% ana A. 0 2% r e sp e ctively . 
Table XXJ...v 
Common Stock - Co s t of Ji'lotation- 1 949-195 2 
No . o f Ave . Size of Co st o f Cornm . & 
Flota tions Flo t a t ion Flotation Discount 
1945-49~*" 
(mill . $ ) % gr . proc e eds % 
1Vierchan.d i s ing 
I ndustry 24 2 . 0 9 . 37 8 . 02 
All I ndusyry 2 57 2 .9 9 . 61 8 . 47 
1 9 50- 1 9 52-"'~ 10 . 9 
All Retailing 1 8 2 . 1 
Dept . Sto r es 7 3 . 3 8 . 8 9 . 0 
Worn ens Apparel 
Sou r ce : -nu . s . Secu riti e s & Exch2 .•.nge Cormnission, "Survey o f 
American Li s ted Corpo rations , Co st o f Flotation , 
1945-49 11 , Wash i ng t on , D. C. , 1 949 , p . 35 
otr.e r 
Ex p . 
% 
1 . 35 
1 . 14 
1 . 9 
1 .1 
.,~-*Compi led from raYi. data pre sen t e d i n U. S . Secu.r i t i e s 
& Exch ange Commi ssion, nco s t o f Flotation", Washi n g ton 
D. C. , 1 950 ,. 1 952 seconC!. quarter . 
In t he period 1950 t rough t he se cond quarte r l 9 52 , 
co st o f f lo tation of common stock f o r r e tail i ng wa s 1 0 . 9% o f 
t he g ro s s proc eeds . Thi s was much higher t h a_Yl the costs o f 
i ssu ing p r eferred sto ck (6 . 1%) o r bond s (2 . 9%) i n these year s 
..:> (.. 
and was e verJ h i gher than the co sts f or e a rl i e r p e rio d s . " 
Dep <:· . .rtment stores and women ' s a pparel shops showed co st s o f 
fl o tation o f 8 . 8% for 1950- 52 , lov'l'e r t h an fo r t e tailing i n 
general , but h i gh e r than f l otation expense o f bonds an d pref'-
-'~-'(-
erred s tock . "' 
~~-X-I bid . 
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We con clud e th rt t t he cost o f floati n g common 
:-; t o ck i'or department stores wa s signi ficant l y greater than 
issu i ng o th e r type s of secur i t i e s . 
Common stock f lo tation costs , t h ough l c:.r ge , vi-ere 
l ess f o r me r chandi sing s e curi t i e s tha:.'l. t hey were f or all 
i ndu stri e s t ogether . Of the 257 nev common sto cks li sted 
in the 1945- 49 p eriod , t he a v erage size o f t ' e i s ~'Ue wa s 
$2 . 9 million and the co sts were 9 . 61% of t h e gro ss p roc eeds . 
Co s ts o f fl o tation of department store stock wa s l e ss than f or 
r etailing i n general i n the 1950- 52 p e r i od . There ar e n o 
f i ures available f o r a ll industry f lo tati on costs f o r this 
exa c t period . A survey was done f o r t h e pe riod 1951 , 1953 
* and 1955 . Common stock fl ota tion costs f o r all sec1u· i t i e s 
ran 10 . 28% or about t he same as r e tailing i n general , but 
substan t ially above t h e c o st s f or department store s . The 
c o st s o f flot i ng common sto ck wa s about t he s ame f o r r e tai l-
i ng E~ s for all i ndustries , but that departr·lent store f s e s 
v ere cheaper than both t h e se c a t egori e s . 
More current mat e rial on costs o f flotation o f 
securiti e s by depar t ment store s anci o t her re t a il estab-
blishmen~ is not ava ilable . &~wever , i f the past is any 
gui de t o t r1 e p resent and t ne future , we can c onc lude two things : 
f irst , tl a t f lota tion costs are h i gher f o r common stock t an 
•'<-5 1 , p . 37 
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they are f or other retailing securiti e s; an d se condly , depa rt-
men t store f lo tation costs f or cornmon stock are l ess than 
t a o se f or al l industri e s taken as a wnole . 
In connection with our stu dy of cost of common 
stock securities i t will be 'helpful to l ook at t h e divi dend 
poli cie s of dep E1.rtrn ent store s . Though t his is not a direct 
cost , i t is c erta i n l y an importan t L t ctor to conside r in 
conne ction with stock is .suance . In a survey of dividend 
policie s of some l arger department store s and dry good ch a i ns , 
Standard & Poor ' s found th o. t divi dend payments were gener -
ally conserva tive i n pre-war years . Reasons for t h i s con s e rva-
tism are t hought to s tem f rom cyclical patte rns i n operations 
an d the n ecessity of replenishing 11 depression-f oste r ed" 
stra in on working capital. In comp ar ing ave rage di vidend 
pa yu1ents as a pe rcentage of n e t after tax earnings on cormuon 
stock , we f i nd a decided increase over the years. 
Table XXXVI 
Dep a.r t men t Store Pay- out Rat i os, 1945 , 1950, 1955 . Di vided 
as perc en t of ne t after tax earn ing s on common stock 
~ ll5.Q 1955 
.Allied 35 . 8 44 . 8 60 . 5 
As s o . Dry Go od s 25 . 0 48 . 3 48.9 
City 31 . 2 47 . 2 61.1 
Emporium Capwell 57 . 6 46 . 1 42 . 6 
F'eds rated 34 . 7 39 . 1 46.9 
Gimbels 15 . 2 30 . 2 34 . 8 
Hech t 57 . 4 29 .0 47 . 6 
Interstate 40 . 9 31 . 9 46 . 9 
hllacy 62.3 59 .7 60 . 6 
Marshall Fi el d 47 . 6 56.0 57 . 3 
May 56 . 1 43 -4 61 . 5 
Ivie rc an ti le 20 .7 29 . 0 57 . 4 
National 25 . 8 78 . 9 · ~ \~ ., v "':t\1\-t\"i("" 
Penney 
.7.5h1 ~ ~ Average 42 . 1 45 . 7 49 . 1 
Sour ce : Standard & Poor's Industry Survey , Retail Trad e , 
Dept ., Mail Order, Et c . , Nov . 15 , 1956 , P . r . 106 
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In 1945 t r1e average Fas 42 .1% in 1950 , 45 . 7% and in 1955 , 
49 . 11L Dividend payments seem to h.:we become more libera l 
over t ' e years . The l a r ger well-entren ched comp ani e s 
h ave made liberal payments even i n poor years , .':J nd t h e 
l e.rg e s t perc entage payments h ave be en made by the strongest 
f irms sue~ a s lVJacy ' s , May 's ar1d Penny's . 
I n summary, common stock financing is of maj or 
i mp ortanc e f or dep a rtment s to re s. The costs of floating 
t hese i ssue s are hig[1er than f or o th er forms of financing , but 
unde r the over - all industry costs. Dividend payments on 
popular i ssues f luc t uated as a percentage of earn ing s over 
t he ye a rs , but presentl y appear to be at a h i gh point . Since 
department store earnings f luctuated wi dely, due to high fixed 
chG.r ge s, lov~ marg i ns of profits and severe compe ti t ion, 
common stock offe rs department s tore s a great advantag e . 
There a r e f i xed pa-y1nents and management is free to ch rul.ge 
t h e dividends i n bad p eriods withou t threat to the comp anie s 
solvency . 
5. Othe r Me thods of Financing 
a. Pref erred Sto ck 
Preferred stock has been but a mli1or factor i n 
department ::~ tore s capital s tructure . In vi ewing t c1e agg regate 
balance shee t account s f or retail ing -gensra_~ mer chandi sing 
i n t e r ms of percentag e o total assets f or the years 1950- 54, 
..,. .• H. 
preferred stock ranged from about 4- 7% .n 
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Tabl e XXXVI I 
Cost of Floating Preferred Stock 1945- 52 
1945-49-;,'-
iVJerchandi sing 
Industry 
All Industry 
1950-52 (Second 
All Retailing 
Dept . Sto re s 
Women 's Apparel 
No. of Ave . Si ze of Cost of Flo tation 
Flotations Flota tion % of gross n~oceeds 
31 
236 
Quarter) -*->\-
8 
2 
4 .1 mill . 
6 . 3 
6 . 3 
3 . 5 
4 . 02 mill . 
4 . 21 
6 . 1 
4 . 3 
Sou r c e : -*U. S. Secu riti e s & Exci1ange Commi ssion , "Survey of 
American L""" s ted Cor porations, Cost of Flotation, 
1945-49 11 , Washington , D. C. , 1949, p . 35 
~H*"Compiled fr om raw data presented in U. S. Securi t i e s 
& Exchange Commi ssion , 11 Co st of Flota tion 11 , Wash i n g ton 
D. C., 1950-1952 s econ d quar ter . 
In t h e peri od 19 50 througn t lle second quarte r 1952 t here 
were on l y n ine retailing preferred i s sues reg i stered ~ith 
t he SEC f or sale t c. the general public . Of this nwllber 
on ly t [Hee were i ssu ed by departmen t store s, two of which 
v,e h a ve full cost i nformation and are i n cluded in t he chart 
above . In t he 1945- 49 period , t here were 31 mer ci:l e:tlldi sing 
prefe rred s tock r eg i s tered f or i ssue , which wa s l arger than 
t t1e nru ber of bonds ru1.d comm.on sto ck i ssues fl oated . We 
conclude fr om t ·1e limited i nformation available , t hat t h e 
popularity of financing t i.1.rougc1 preferred stock for mer-
ch andi s i ng establishment s app ears to be d Ji ndl i ng . 
Tne cost of f loating p referred stock was substantially 
below t hat o f common stock , th ougr1 above t :te cos t of bond 
fl otation . Sin c e t he department sto re sample is so limi t ed 
Vie mu ~ t u se retailin g figure s f o r comp aring preferred stock 
cos t s flotation to t nat of all i ndustry . Co s t of fl oating 
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preferre d. stock ran 6 .1% of t he proceeds of t es e i ssu.a s 
i'or r etailing i n the 1950-52 p eriod, and the ave r age size 
of t he i ssue was $6 . 3 mill ion. In ti1e 1951, 53- 55 survey 
" . if' 
costs f or all pr eferred stock i ssuanc..:e s ran 4 . 25% . In 
contrast during t '_e 1945-1949 p 8riod , co st of f loating 
mer chand.isin preferred stock ran 4 . 02~~ v.:hile all i ndustr i es 
;,,a s 4 . 21% . Even though preferred stock co sts were l e ss tha 
&_ll industr y costs i n t tle earli er period, tlley increased 
substantially in later years . Perhaps the incre~se in cost 
i s what de t e rre d departr;1ent stores f rom i s suing preferred 
stock to a l a r ger extent . 
b . Affiliated Real Estate Compani e s: 
Anoth er -lf'.r a y of financing new store s is t h r ough 
affiliated r eal e state compm1i e s . Under t h is arrangement an 
a ffiliated real e state comp any is organized ruLd it ovms t h e 
p rop erty and leases it to t he department store . The i n come 
rom t he r eal estate is the only income of this r ea.:L e state 
f irm. 
I n surance compani e s will lend t he realty company funds 
a s they ge t a be tter interest rate f rom l ending money to t h e 
a f fili a te than they do f rom lendin g funds to the depa rtment 
store. Hi gh er rate s of i nterest a re necessary as the loan 
involve s more r isk on the par t of t he lender, since t h e 
depar t Eient s tore is not directly liable for t he debt . Lo ans 
ar e usually s e cured t h rough a l ease of t r1e de:partmen t store 
and t £'1 er e f ore i ndirectly depend on the store's abl1i t y to 
pay rent . 
-~- 51 , p 0 37 
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There a r e several advru1tage s in f i nancing t 'u·oug' l 
multip l e corporations . Fir ~ t is the tax ang l e . Each 
Corporat ion is taxed a t a rate of 30% on its first $25 , 000 
o f p r o f i t , and 52% on the profits in exc e ss of this amount . 
By c reating two compm1.i e s , t he c1epartmen t store wi ll save 
* 5500 ( 22% o f ~2 5 , 000) . This saving s i n taxe s is offset t o 
so:11e extent by i n i t ial and regula r running co s ts of a 
corpo l.,a ti on . 
An ad~~i tional a dvantag e i n using rnul tipl e co rporati ons 
lie s in th ! f a c t that eac c1 f i r m i s entitled to accumulate 
:W60 ,000 o f e a.r nings u..J.der t h e p resen t tax law. A sur t ax is 
impo s ed on re tained e a rning s vih ich ar e deeme d to be bey ond 
.,~ 
t h e reasona ble needs o f the business . Th.e first $60 , 000 
of ear:r; i ng s i s ex ei:pt fr om t his char g e . Tnerei'o re t he 
depa rtment s tore ce:1n r e tain t wice a s much earnings with out 
risk ing t t1e penalty o f a surtax . Th is advantage i n retaini ng 
r c;ar i": i ngs is on l y g oo d for a fa:;nily corporation . 
There i s also a l egal advan tage inhe r ent in 
f inancing t h rough a ff iliated corpora tions. Stockholder s 
liability to creditor s is limited. to the amount o f t h e ir 
i:nvest~n en t . A department store pl annin g a. financiall y risk y 
r eal e state enterpri se will limit its liability by maki ng 
i t s elf a stockh older in t he affili a ted r eal e state company . 
~'"54, paragraph 25 , 094 
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A change in t he production fun c tion of department 
stores is apparent . Depa.rtment stor·e s mee t tL1e challenge 
of expansion i :: t o suburban marke ts . All o ver t h e country 
stores open up new branci.1 out l e ts in outlying d i stricts . The 
growing moneyed mi ddl e i n come groups are 1ni g ra ting to suburban 
c ommuni ties . They prefer to do their shopping in convenient , 
e a si l y acce ssi -bl e locations . To day stores with branche s d o 
ore bu siness than sing l e u.ni t esto.bl ishmen ts . Th ough t he se 
bran ch op erations increase sale s , there is n o c lee.r--cut 
advantag e in their operation a s far as prof'i ts are conc -2rn ~ • 
i' et profit on eac 1 sale s dolla r i s lovrer f o r departmeLt stores 
-.:i t /:1 bra_ che s than f o r stores v:i t h out subsidiari e s . 
The industry faces t he problem o f dwi ndling sal e 
in u. ov,Tt to~;~n rnetropolitan districts . As long a s t hese central-
l y locate d s tores continue to draw a r -:o asonable vol u .: e of 
busine s s i t is doub tful that they will be sacrificed . They 
rep r esen t substantial i nvestJlents and sho 1 good operating 
re:=.ul ts. Ov.n e rs invest money with h ope o f stimula ting s al e s . 
In the futu re we s nall continue t o s ee metropolitan stores 
wi t h branche s in out l y i ng areas an d sh opp i ng cen t e rs . 
Sin ce World War II t he r e has b een a decline i n t he 
sta tus of t l:1e deuar t ;;1ent store both i n t he retailing inCius try 
and the total e c onomy. Departinent s tores face new c omp e titive 
i_}re ssure s . Discount h ous e s , warehouse store s, and supermarkets 
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take ove r soJJ1 e of the i r t r aditi onal pro duct lines . 
The de-oartment store op e rate s on a low n e t mr=crg i n 
of pro f it . Today upv,iard pre : su re o f e}:p ense rates s ;.rueeze 
pro f i t s . P a y roll costs hav e i ncrea s ed i n t he l i ght o f 
infl ati on but price s hav e n o t grown at a compar able rate . 
Si nce pri ce s are de t e r min ed by competition , dep a rtment store s 
f i nd t b e y c nnn o t pass on t h ese i n creased c o sts t o t h e public . 
A h ope f o r t he departwen t sto re of the f uture lie s wi t1· 
automation . The the i n -c roduction of e l ectronic data pro cess-
ing sto r e s mi gn t be able t o cut down on t heir op e r a tin g 
expenses and preserve their p l a c e i n t h e e conomy. 
In the nast year s t here h as b een a tremendou s grov,-th 
in t he us e o f con smner c r ecli t i n the retai l i ng e c onomy . 
Mo r e cu ::. tomers bu y credit and more fund s are t ied up i n account s 
rece i vabl e . :Re t ail e r s hav e f ound cr e dit to be a valuable but 
ex t:1en sive p romotion a l t ool . As a r e sul t depar t lil ent sto re s 
fa.ce t ne problern of financing increased sh o r t - t c: rm n e ed s f o r 
cash . Fcmd s may carne f r om i n t e r nal sou r c e s su ch as e a r n ing s 
o r depre c i a tion . f:l o l'\~ever a l arge par t o f t i:J.e c apital to fi.nanc e 
t h ese transactions i s a c qui r e d through ou t sid e orga i zations . 
The re t a iler may o t tain funds t h roug ," banl'i: borrowi ng , sales 
financ e c ompan i es o r fa c t o r s . I n an ei·f o r t t o o f fse t c o s t s 
depa rtrnent s tore s uti li ze carryi ng charge s on i n s tallment and 
ov e rdue ac coun t s . 
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Since departme11 t s o :r:·es fun c ti on on a lovJ op e rating 
pro f it marg in, income f rom sour ce s oth e r than dire ct buy-
i ng and selling o f g oo ds i s an i mpo rtan t contr i buti on t o 
ne t e2.r:tnng s . Reve:nu e fr om c a.rryi ug ch a r g e s and l eased 
.ep c-;. r t illen t op e rations are t n e principal cons t itu ents o 
nothe r i n come " . Depar t ments mo .:. .. t c ommonly l eased ar e 
tho se t h 2 t requ i re sp e cialize d p er s onnel . The l e ssee 
assu me s t ~e ri sk s i nhe r en t in ope r ation s a:ild pay s the 
d epartment store a s e t f e e . Actual l y s to re s sacrif i ce 
lJo ten tial pro f' i t i n payment for th e l e ssee t s assumption 
o f r i s1c. It may be worthwhile f or dep artment stores to 
i n v e stiga t e t h e poss i bility o f owning and operating some 
of t h ese customa r i l y l eased depar t ments. 
P e r h aps t he f o remo s t problem con!'ronting t h e d e par t-
ruen t store i s f i nanc ing i t s own long t e r m cap i tal r equirements . 
Comp<:m i e s must r a i s e funds to financ e t h eir expan s ion 
i nto new suburban outlet s . The s tore may rent space i n 
a s · op p ing ce r-1 ter or may p :cefer to e r e ct i t s mm s tructure . 
Cos t s involved are formi dable . The f irm ma y finance its n e eds 
t h rough t h e i s su an ce of debt , but i n g ene r a ... t h e retail i ng 
i ndustr y ha s avo i ded su c :1 fixed char g e obligations . Th e 
company may f inru1ce through the e quity root, bu t public 
i ssuance of stock is limited t o t h e l arg e r firms . Th e y ma y 
f ind t h a t raising f unds t hrough a sale an d lea sebacl-c 
a rrang ement or t h rough an affil i a t e d real e state comp an y 
i s mo st p ro f itabl e . Each case must be consi der ed i n divi duall y . 
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We h a ve seen i n t h is p ap e r h ov. t h e f unction ing o 
denartw ent sto r e s ha s ch anged . Th i s chan e e h a s provoked 
man y new f inancial i ssues . Alth ough we hav n o t solved 
t he probl ems , s ince n o solu t i on is a pplicable i n a ll c as e s , 
it is h op ed that this analysis o f the total industry will 
i:le l p the i ndivi dual store find i t s own particu lar solution . 
The future f or the depar t ment store industry is 
pre c a rious . Stor e s mu s t find a vvay t o control expense s an d 
i n c rease t heir p ro f it margins . They must find vmys to c al leng e 
their n ew competitors in order t o mainta i n their share of 
th e consumer dollar . Car ~;ful f inancial pl a:..~-ming i s e s sel."".t t ial 
fo r t ne su :r·v i va l o f t h e mode r n department store . 
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BLAl\J AC.L'.J St~ ~.t!,'J.' l T.u:1S AS PE1-i.C~\iTAGE OF 'O'.tAG ASS;:.,TS-1950-1 952 
All Manufacturing Comp ani e s : 1950 1951 1952 
Ca sh 
U.S. Gove rnm en t Se cu riti e s 
Acc oill1 t s & Note s Receivable-ne t 
I nventori e s 
Oth e r Current Assets 
Total Current Assets 
Plan.t , propert y , e Cj_uip~ent-ne t 
Other asse ts, inc. def . ch a r ge s 
Tota l Assets 
Bailie loans payable in one year 
Other n otes & accounts p ayc.bl e 
Federal Income Tax Accru~~d 
Tota l Curren t Liabilities 
Long-Te r m Debt-Ba~k Loans 
Long-T,zrw. Debt-Othe r 
Othe r Liabilities 
Reserve s 
Capital Stock, Capital Surplus 
Earned Su r ph1.s , Surpl u s Reserve 
10 .3 
9 •. 4 
1 2 .7 
2.3 .6 
1.2 
57.2 
35.8 
7.0 
100. 0 
2 .1 
7.1 
A_,_Q 
20 . 0 
1.6 
7. 2 
.7 
2.2 
.30.9 
ILJJ: 
100.0 
9 . 4 
9.0 
1.3.4 
26 .3 
1.3 
59 .4 
.34.1 
~ 
100.0 
3.3 
7.7 
.h.Q 
25.0 
1 .6 
6 . 8 
. 8 
1.8 
27. 8 
36 . 2 
1 00 . 0 
9 .2 
7.3 
14 • .3 
26 . 8 
1.4 
59.0 
34.? 
~ 
100 .0 
3.9 
8 .1 
~ 
25. 5 
2 .0 
7.6 
.9 
1.5 
27.2 
~ 
100.0 
Source : Computed from r aw dat a pr esent e d i n U.S. Federal Trade 
Commis sion m1d Securitie s & Exchang e Co~mission, 
Qu arter l y Financial_Report , U,S. Manufacturing 
Corporations Wa sh i n gton, D.C. 
All Retailing 
Cash 
U.S. Gover~ment Securiti e s 
Total Ca sh & U.S. Securities 
Note s and Accounts Receivable 
I nventori e s 
Other Current Asse ts 
To tal Current Assets 
Plant, property, equipmen t 
Other Assets 
Total Asset s 
B<n"lk LoaiJ.S Pay able withi n 1 yea r 
Oth e r notes & accolh"lt s p ayable 
Federal I n come Tax accrued 
Other current liabilities 
Total Cu rren t Liabilities 
Long Te r m Debt-Bank Loan s 
Long Ter m Debt-Other 
Othe r Liabilities 
Reserves 
Capital Stock, Cap i tal Surplus 
Earned Su r plu s, Surplus Reserve s 
12.6 
_hQ 
1 5. 6 
20 .1 
34-4 
2 .5 
72 .6 
22 .6 
~ 
1 00 .0 
.3 . 4 
14 .6 
5.9 
~ 
28 . 2 
1.3 
5.0 
1.5 
1.1 
26 .4 
36 .5 
1 00 .0 
Not Given 
Not Given 
1.3. 9 
19 • .3 
.37.0 
_k_l 
72.3 
22.8 
~ 
100.0 
4-4 
1A ... 1 
5.4 
~ 
27.6 
1 . 8 
4.8 
1.5 
.9 
25.9 
~ 
100.0 
11.9 
~ 
14 • .3 
20 .1 
.34.7 
2 . 2 
71.3 
22 .8 
~ 
1 00 .0 
~ .. . 5 
12 .7 
4.6 
~ 
25 .6 
1.9 
5.5 
.9 
. 8 
25 . 2 
ML4 
100.0 
Source: Computed from data pre scmted in U.S. Fede .c al Trade Com-
mission and Securitie s & Exchange Com., Quarte rl '~" Finan cial 
Repo~ts U.S. Retail & Wholesale CorJ or ations 195052. 
w~~h inP"t.nn. D.C. 
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BAL1LiC.8 SrtEET l TEliflS AS PBRC&~TAGE OF TOTAL ASSSTS-1950-1951 
Retailing-Gen eral Me-rchcmdi se 
Ca sh 
U.S. Gove rnment Securitie s 
To tal Ca sh & U. S. Securities 
No t e s & Account s Rec e i vabl e 
Inven t ori es 
Other Current As sets 
Total Current Asse ts 
Pl ant , Property , Equi pQent 
Oth e r Assets 
Total Asset s 
Banl( Loans payable wit hi n l year 
Oth er n otes & accour::.ts payable 
Ac crued t axes 
Other Current Liabilities 
To tal Curr ent Liabilities 
Long Te r m Debt-Bank loan s 
Long Te rm Debt-Other 
Oth e r Li abilitie s 
To t a l Li abilitie s 
Rese rv-e s 
Capital Stock, Cap t t Surp ., Min. 
Earned Surpl u s, Surplus Reserve 
Total Stockholde rs Equity 
Total Liab . & Stockholder Equity 
1950 
11.6 
~ 
16.5 
20 .9 
31 . 6 
_LQ 
70.6 
25.1 
__iu_1 
100.0 
1.9 
9. 0 
7.4 
..2....4 
23 .7 
1.7 
4 -9 
__J_ 
31. 0 
1.5 
27.5 
1&s..Q 
69 . 0 
100.0 
1951 
10.1 
~ 
14 .5 
13 .9 
35 .1 
__h2 
70 .0 
25.7 
~ 
100 .0 
3.1 
8 .0 
6.9 
--'uQ 
22 .6 
2 .7 
4.8 
~ 
31 .0 
1.1 
27 .5 
~ 
~ 
100 . 0 
Sour ce: Computed from data presen t ed in U.S. Federal Trade 
Commi s sion and Se curi tie s and Exchange Comr11i ssion , 
()Ual" te r l v Fi n ancial Repor ts , U. S . Retail & Wlwle sa.le 
Corpora t ions , 1950, 19 51, Wa shington , D.C. 
-
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Co s t of Flota tion 
Cost of Flot&tion of New I ssu e s of Securitie s Effec t i vely 
Reg istered Du.ring 1945- 1949 for Ca sh Sale Thru Inve s t ment 
Ba....Ylt:e rs to t h e Ge:.1e ral Public Shovvr1 As a Percent of Gross 
Proc eeds : 
No. of Ave . Si ze of Co s t of Commi s s ion 
Flota tions Flota tion Flota tion & Discount 
(mill s ~ 1 oi v % 
Merchandising Industry 
Eonci s 5 8 . 2 2 . 58 1 . 69 
Pref . Sto ck .31 4 . 1 -'l-· 02 .3 . 1.3 
Common Stoc.k 24 2 . 0 9 • .37 8 . 02 
Un segr ego.ted 19 .3 . 8 5-45 4 - 58 
Type s of Sec . 
All I ndu s try 
Bonds .360 25 • .3 1 • .30 0 . 78 
Pref . Stock 2.36 6 • .3 Ly . 21 J . ,q.6 
Common Stocx 257 2 . 9 9 . 61 8 . 47 
Un s egrega ted 182 8 . 9 .3 . 24 2 . 52 
Typ e s of Sec. 
Source : U. S. Secur iti e s & Exchang e Commi s sion, Sur vey of 
Amer i ca.n Li s ted Corpo-ra t i ons, Co st of Flot a tion , 
1945-42 Wa sh ington , D. C., 1949 , p • .35 
Co s t of Flot a tion of New Is su es of Se curitie s Eff ectively 
Heg i s t e r ed I n 1950- 1952 secoEd quart e r : 
Other 
Exp . 
Cf 
0 
0 . 90 
0 . -39 
1 • .35 
0 . 88 
0 . 52 
J . 75 
1.14 
0 . 7.3 
No . of Ave . Si ze of Co s t of Comm i s sion & Other 
Flota tions Flot . (mil]. $ ) Flot . % Discm.mt % Exu . % 
All Ret aili ng 
Bon d s .3 5.1 2 . 9 1 . 6 1 • .3 
Pref . Sto ck 8 6 • .3 6 . 1 4 • .3 1 . 8 
Common Stock 18 2.1 10 . 9 9 . 0 1 . 9 
Departlflent Stores-Women s 
Bond s 2 
Pr ef . Stock 2 
Common Stoclr 7 
Appar~l 
.3 . 6 
.3 . 5 
.3 • .3 
.3 . 0 
4 - .3 
8 . 8 
1 . 5 
2. 8 
7 . 7 
1 . 5 
1 . 5 
l . l 
Sou rce : Compiled f r om r aw dat a or esen t ed in U. S. Securiti e s & 
Ex ch ange Comr.uis s ion , Co st of Fl o t a tion , Wa shin g t on , D. C. 
1950- 1952 Second Qu arter , Quart erly Issue s 
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COST OF FLOTATION 
Co s t of Flota t i on of Registered I ssu e s O ffer~d t c t h e Gen er al 
Pu bl ic By Si ze of Is su e s and Type of Se curity , 19 51, 19 53, 
and 1955 . As a Perc en t of Gro ss Pr oceeds: 
Co s t of Flot :=t, ti on Compensa tion 
Bond s, Note s & De bent. 
Prefe r r ed Stock 
Common Stock 
1.49 
4-34 
10. 28 
.so 
3 .34 
8 .75 
Exnen se 
.59 
1.22 
1. 8 5 
Source: U.S. Securiti e s & Exchange Com.m.ission, Co s t of 
Flot2.tion of' Corpora t e Se cur i t i e s 1 951-19 5..5_, 
Wa sh i ng t on, D.C., 19 57 
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